

Is There a Chance for a Common European Culture of Remembrance?

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Over the past several years, there has been an intensification of the debate in Europe over its tragic past, in particular regarding the period of World War II (WWII), its aftermath, and the relation of contemporary Europe to the totalitarian regimes in power during that period. This debate was set in motion by politicians and historians of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, who feel that so far the perception of Europe's tragic past varies greatly depending on whether it is viewed upon from the "Eastern" or "Western" perspective.

The crimes of Nazi Germany were unequivocally condemned by the international community after WWII, while the Nuremberg Trials epitomized this condemnation. Few, if any, people have questioned the necessity to condemn Nazi crimes and to penalize the promotion of Nazi ideology or the denial of their crimes, of which Holocaust obviously stands out as the most horrific and mind-shattering case. By achieving widespread condemnation of Nazi ideology and Nazi crimes we have attempted to establish moral and legal principles in order to prevent the recurrence of similar horrors in the future.

For many in the CEE countries, especially in the Baltic States, Stalinism was a greater evil than Nazism. Arguably this was so merely because the Soviet occupation of these countries lasted much longer than the Nazi occupation. Recorded data show that during Stalin's regime up to 700 000 Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians were deported, from the population of six million. In Poland, some 1.5 million people were deported, of these 760 000 died, many of them children¹. According to academic research, the Soviet occupation and Stalin terror totalled in the loss of every third resident of Lithuania². It therefore seems reasonable that nations

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¹ Speech by Jerzy Buzek at the conference "Europe 70 Years After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact", European Parliament, Brussels, 14 October 2009.

² Speech by Irena Degutiene at the conference "Europe 70 Years After the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact", European Parliament, Brussels, 14 October 2009.

which had suffered so bitterly would have the right to demand that these crimes be internationally condemned, similarly to how Nazi crimes were condemned after WWII.

In this context there can be no date more symbolic than 23 August, 1939, when the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (together with its secret protocols) was signed. This date is the symbol of the evil intentions of the two European totalitarian regimes that made a deal to divide Europe. This deal may also be considered as a starting point for the ensuing crimes that the two regimes later committed.

And yet the post-Communist European Union (EU) countries face substantial resistance against their efforts to achieve the condemnation of Stalin's crimes on an equal or similar footing as those of Nazi Germany. In his article "Why a Common European Culture of Remembrance Shall Not Emerge", Dutch historian Jeroen Bult puts forward a number of arguments as to why the post-Communist countries have found it so difficult to "integrate the crimes of Communism i.e. the Soviet Union into the pan-European historical consciousness"³.

According to Bult, Germany, the biggest EU member state, is the main obstacle for the creation of a common European culture of remembrance, with an equal standing of Nazism and Communism. Bult argues that juxtaposing Nazism and Communism is a great taboo in academic and political circles in Germany. Yet, Germany's historically inspired restraints seamlessly coincide with other factors as well, such as commemorative traditions and peculiarities in different EU countries that are supposed to strengthen national identity; the influential progressive "anti-fascist" paradigm; business, i.e. energy, interests in Russia that have brought about a form of self-censorship; and Nazism and its sadistic practices as the ultimate "tool" for self-reflection and self-chastisement.

Bult sets out his reasons in a consistent and reasonable manner. I can agree with most of them, but not the conclusion that a "common perception of Europe's disastrous twentieth century history will not emerge in the years and decades to come".

³ Jeroen Bult, "Why a Common European Culture of Remembrance Shall Not Emerge", *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 2010 (24).

Two Key Obstacles

In this opinion article I would like to discuss two main reasons for the resistance the CEE countries face. I believe that these two are the key obstacles in understanding the problem, whereas the other hindrances merely derive from them.

The first reason is the past and the current economic and political relationship between Russia and the biggest member states of the EU, primarily Germany, France, and Italy. In fact, many explanations of the differing interpretations of history go all the way back to the years of WWII. Back then Western European countries accepted the Soviet interpretation of certain events mainly due to the fact that the Soviet Union was a crucial ally in their war and eventual victory against Nazi Germany. According to the renowned British historian Norman Davis, such acquiescence was evident already during WWII, when the allied countries needed the support of the Soviet Union in containing Nazi expansion. For example, his research into classified documents of the UK of the time indicate that the guilt of the Soviet Union behind the Katyn massacre was a “near certainty”, but an alliance with the Soviets was deemed to be more important than moral issues; thus the official version supported the Soviet version, up to censoring the contradictory accounts⁴.

The same was true, for example, of the interpretation of the occupation of the Baltic States. During the Cold War most Western European countries accepted the Soviet version that the Baltic States joined the Soviet Union voluntarily. This interpretation remained after WWII as well. As years passed by, it got entrenched deep in the teachings of history in Western European countries.

After the collapse of the USSR there was hope that Russia itself would re-assess its history and unequivocally condemn Stalin's crimes. Indeed, there was quite a significant recognition of these crimes under Boris Yeltsin, the first democratically elected president of the Russian Federation, who condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, admitted that the Baltic States were illegally annexed by Russia during WWII, and clearly recognized that the Katyn massacre was committed by Soviet soldiers. Ten years later, however, with Vladimir Putin's rise to power, these tendencies gradually started to be reversed. For already ten years now there has been substantial re-romanticization of the Soviet past and even some pro-Stalinist

⁴ Norman Davies, *Europe: A History*, HarperCollins, 1998

propaganda. This became noticeable in TV programmes broadcast by state-owned television channels, in films created, or in newly released history books for school-children that gloss over Stalin's terror and justify many of his mass crimes claiming that conditions of the time "demanded" it⁵.

Another part of the story is that with Putin's advent to power, Russia became adept at using certain European dependencies and vulnerabilities in a much more determined and consistent manner. In particular, this applies to Europe's dependence on Russian supplies of energy resources. Most of the Western European countries realized how vulnerable and risky their dependence on Russian energy is during the 2006 winter gas crisis, when millions of European energy consumers were faced with reduced quantities of gas delivered because of the conflict over supply provisions and transit prices between Russia and Ukraine. Whether deliberate or not, this was a signal that Europe has to take Russia's interests into account if it wants to remain warm during the winter.

Ever since part of Russia's strategy has been to maintain some level of uncertainty about the geography of its future supplies. Some of Russia's leaders, including Putin and Chairman of Gazprom Alexey Miller, have more than once indicated that Russia can redirect its oil and gas supplies away from Europe and either build LNG terminals or new pipelines to Asia⁶. Considering that Europe will have to import more energy resources (especially gas) in the future, this serves as a major "softener" of its policy vis-à-vis Russia.

What is more, European companies like E.ON-Ruhrgas, Shell, BP, Total and others are among the most active in Russia's energy market making multi-billion dollar profits every year. Meanwhile Russia has consistently demonstrated that if things do not go as it wishes, foreign energy companies will suffer first (recall Russia's unexpected decision to go it alone with the Shtokman oil field in 2005). That is why the biggest European energy companies, exerting significant influence over their governments, lobby for friendlier and more stable relations with Russia without irritants, such as the revision of certain historical inaccuracies or the condemnation of Stalin's crimes. In his article Bult advances a similar argument

⁵ Most of these trends are eloquently captured by Arkady Ostrovsky in his article in the *Prospect Magazine* called "Flirting with Stalin" - <http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2008/09/flirtingwithstalin/>

⁶ Roman Kupchinsky, "LNG - Russia's New Energy Blackmail Tool", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume: 6 Issue: 77, 22 April 2009 - [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=34888](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34888)
Jeremy Page, "Putin threatens to divert oil to Far East", *The Times*, 27 April 2006 - <http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/article710012.ece>.

and states that “nowadays it is mainly Western European businessmen and (ex-) politicians longing for lucrative energy contracts who are trying to appease Moscow and are taking its interpretation of history for granted”.

On the other hand, it is also true that neither was there a significant desire among Western European leaders to re-assess WWII history after the end of the Cold War. Indeed, usually one cares more about one’s own sufferings rather than someone else’s. Besides, there was hope in the 1990’s that the Russian society would carry out this task on its own. When Putin came to power, energy and other interests quickly took the place of the more “moral” side of Europe’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia.

The second reason for the continuing difficulties in achieving Europe-wide condemnation of Stalin’s crimes has been the way these efforts have been carried out by CEE leaders themselves and the fear they have created that such a condemnation could endanger the preservation of the memory of the victims of Holocaust.

Many institutions or individuals around the world dedicated to the preservation of the memory of Holocaust, have expressed their outright concern, if not anger, about such efforts. For example, in response to the Prague Declaration, which grew out of the Conference on European Conscience and Communism, held in the Czech capital in June 2008, Dr Shimon Samuels, Simon Wiesenthal Centre’s Chief Delegate and Director for International Relations, sent an official statement to the OSCE, in which he warned about the “ulterior agenda” of the Prague Declaration, “the real purpose of which is to supplant Holocaust Memorial Day in Europe”⁷. He also accused some of the CEE intellectuals behind the Prague Declaration, such as Vaclav Havel, Vytautas Landsbergis and others, as having “anti-Semitic, racist and Holocaust distortionist motives”. Another vocal critic of the efforts of the post-Communist countries to revive the memory of Stalin’s crimes – Dovid Katz – has called such efforts “Holocaust obfuscation”. Some Jewish scholars see them as “the gravest threat to preserving the memory of the Holocaust”⁸.

⁷ Shimon Samuels, “‘Prague Declaration’ is a Project to Delete the Holocaust from European History”, Simon Wiesenthal Centre, 5 October 2009 - <http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/nlnet/content2.aspx?c=lsKWLbPJLnF&b=4441467&ct=7548759>.

⁸ Cnaan Liphshiz, “Holocaust scholars slam EU for backing Nazi-Communist comparison”, *Haaretz*, 26 January 2010 - <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/holocaust-scholars-slam-eu-for-backing-nazi-communist-comparison-1.262074>.

On the one hand, these are exaggerated accounts, and they misrepresent the true motives of the post-Communist politicians and historians. Their efforts are not aimed at obfuscating Holocaust but rather at fully reviving the memory of Stalin's crimes. Essentially, all of them recognize the uniqueness of Holocaust. But in their view, such recognition should not preclude the condemnation of crimes committed by Stalinist USSR that resulted in millions of deaths.

On the other hand, CEE countries, especially the Baltic States, complicate the situation by seeding distrust in relation to their local as well as wider Jewish communities. One of the most acute problems is that most CEE countries have failed to prosecute the remaining Nazi collaborators. After the collapse of the Communist regimes, many of the post-Communist countries have managed to convict people of Communist-era crimes, particularly in relation to deportations after WWII, but have prosecuted in total only three Nazi-era war criminals⁹. Various Jewish institutions have also raised their concern about the re-appearance of anti-Semitic tendencies in CEE countries, especially in the shape of growing ranks and visibility of neo-Nazi organizations. In other words, the existing mistrust exacerbates the situation and leads to a lack of understanding of each other's motives. Those trying to achieve Europe-wide condemnation of Stalinist crimes should therefore spend more time and effort to engage Jewish historians and activists into a wide-ranging and frank discussion over the past events in question.

Moreover, many Holocaust scholars are uneasy with the fact that some politicians in the Baltic States, especially Lithuania, want to label the Soviet deportations and purges experienced by the Baltic people after WWII as *genocide*. A concept feared by them is one of "double genocide", which would effectively mean that the Nazi genocide (against Jews) equals the Stalinist one (against Lithuanians, for example, in Lithuania's case). For example, the museum to commemorate the victims of Stalinist terror in Vilnius is called The Museum of Genocide Victims. Such terminology only complicates matters and appears to be counter-productive.

According to the prominent Lithuanian philosopher, now Member of the European Parliament Prof. Leonidas Donskis, genocide is the annihilation *en bloc* of a people or of a race, irrespective of class divisions, dominant ideology and internal social and cultural differences. According to Donskis, no matter how

⁹ Efraim Zuroff, "Eastern Europe: Anti-Semitism in the Wake of Holocaust-Related Issues", *Jewish Political Studies Review*, 17:1-2 (Spring 2005) - <http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-zuroff-s05.htm>

cruel the Soviet terror that was visited upon the Baltic states, a large segment of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian society, by going over to the other side, by becoming collaborators, was not only able to save itself, but also secure for themselves successful careers in the administration of the occupying regime. Instead, Donskis proposes to use the term stratocide, coined by Soviet dissident Grigory Pomerantz, to describe the annihilation of certain strata and classes within a nation. Pomerantz argued that it was not an entire nation that had been wiped out as a racial or ethnic whole, but its most educated, most cultured and most conscious strata¹⁰. The labelling of Stalin's crimes against the people from the Baltic States as genocide, therefore, invites unnecessary opposition and fear among many that white-washing this important moral and legal term could indeed obfuscate the memory of genocide against the Jewish people during WWII.

The controversial context in which Lithuania and other CEE countries are trying to re-assess historical traumas in turn complicates the very effort to incorporate Stalin's crimes into a pan-European historical conscience. Inevitably, it has a significant impact on the way German society relates to these tragic past events as well. In Germany the existing taboo on juxtaposing Nazism and Communism will not be lifted until there is a broader support and appreciation of the sufferings of those who experienced Soviet terror. This also includes the wider Jewish community, which so far has been uneasy about the way Central and Eastern Europeans have fought for their cause. Therefore, until a more inclusive and subtle approach toward this issue is developed and a genuine dialogue is established with those who seek to preserve the memory of Holocaust, it will be difficult to expect a more favourable attitude of the German society towards the Europe-wide condemnation of Stalin's crimes, too.

Common Culture of Remembrance in Formation?

European dependence on Russia and lack of mutual understanding with institutions seeking to preserve the memory of Holocaust are the two most important reasons behind the continuing difficulties with regard to achieving same

¹⁰ Leonidas Donskis, "The Inflation of Genocide", *European Voice*, 24 July 2009 - <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2009/07/the-inflation-of-genocide/65613.aspx>.

or at least similar condemnation of the Stalinist crimes to those of the Nazis. And yet I would argue that even despite these difficulties, there are signs that a common culture of remembrance in Europe is slowly, but surely taking shape.

One of the institutions that has moved forward in this regard the most is the European Parliament (EP). The EP has taken a consistent stance in favour of condemning Nazism and Communism (Stalinism) on an equal footing as Europe's two major 20th century totalitarian regimes. The EP resolution of 2 April 2010 "On European conscience and totalitarianism" condemned all types of totalitarian regimes but singled out Nazism as "the dominant historical experience of Western Europe" and both Communism and Nazism as totalitarian experiences of Central and Eastern European countries¹¹. This resolution was passed by an almost unanimous vote of 533-44 with 33 abstentions. Among other things, it also clearly stated that "the uniqueness of the Holocaust must nevertheless be acknowledged".

The same declaration of 2 April 2009 also called for the 23 August, the day when the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in 1939, to be proclaimed as a Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for the victims of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. In fact, the EP already called for 23 August to be remembered as such in a separate declaration on 23 September 2008 ("Declaration of the European Parliament on the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism")¹². In 2010, marking the occasion of 23 August, President of the EP Jerzy Buzek called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the "collusion of the two worst forms of totalitarianism in the history of humanity: Nazism and Stalinism", that caused "mass deportations and exterminations"¹³.

The European Commission, for its part, funds a remembrance project for young Europeans called "Active European Remembrance"¹⁴. According to the

¹¹ European Parliament resolution of 2 April 2009 "On European conscience and totalitarianism", Strasbourg - <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2009-0213+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>

¹² Declaration of the European Parliament "On the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism", Strasbourg - <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008-0439&language=EN>

¹³ President Jerzy Buzek on the European Day of Remembrance for victims of Stalinism and Nazism, European Parliament, Brussels, 23 August 2010 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/president/view/en/press/press_release/2010/2010-August/press_release-2010-August-10.html

¹⁴ Website of the project "Active European Remembrance" - http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/programme-actions/doc48_en.htm

Commission, this project is aimed at keeping the memory of the WWII period alive and at ensuring that the mistakes of the past are not repeated and the present is appreciated. Within the framework of “Active European Remembrance” the Commission provides support to projects that “preserve sites of historical and social interest linked to Nazism and Stalinism”. The website of the project provides the following reasoning: “The legacy of Nazism and Stalinism underscore just how important and valuable our current democratic values are. By commemorating the victims, as well as preserving the sites and archives associated with deportations, and myriad other actions, Europeans, particularly younger generations, can draw lessons for the present and the future from these dark chapters in history”.

Another European institution, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), even before the EP expressed its position regarding the common legacy of Europe’s Communist and Nazi totalitarian regimes in its Resolution 1481 (2006) “On the need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes”¹⁵. The resolution states that the “fall of totalitarian communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe has not been followed in all cases by an international investigation of the crimes committed by them. Moreover, the authors of these crimes have not been brought to trial by the international community, as was the case with the horrible crimes committed by National Socialism (Nazism)”.

In a similar vein, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which took place in Vilnius, Lithuania in July 2009, in its final declaration (informally dubbed the “Vilnius Declaration”) of 3 July 2009 noted that “in the twentieth century European countries experienced two major totalitarian regimes, Nazi and Stalinist, which brought about genocide, violations of human rights and freedoms, war crimes and crimes against humanity”¹⁶. The Declaration included a paragraph reiterating the call of the EP to mark 23 August as a European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism

¹⁵ Resolution 1481 (2006) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe “Need for international condemnation of crimes of totalitarian communist regimes”, Strasbourg, 25 January 2006 - <http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/Eres1481.htm>

¹⁶ Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe “On Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century”, Vilnius, 3 July 2009 - http://www.oscepa.org/images/stories/documents/activities/1.Annual%20Session/2009_Vilnius/Final_Vilnius_Declaration_ENG.pdf

and Nazism. The Vilnius Declaration was also adopted with a huge majority – out of 320 lawmakers just 8 voted against and 4 abstained¹⁷.

It is worth noting that the same resolution of the OSCE PA acknowledged “the uniqueness of the Holocaust” and expressed its strong call to fight anti-Semitism in all its forms. It is therefore interesting that in his commentary on the Vilnius Declaration Dovid Katz expressed an opinion that the equal condemnation of the two totalitarian regimes and the encouragement to mark the 23 August as a Europe-wide Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism was “slipped” into the Declaration by “the East European far right”¹⁸.

It is true that most of these monumental documents or projects of various European institutions were initiated by members from Central and Eastern Europe. This, however, demonstrates that the debate on Europe’s tragic past has been changing significantly exactly because Europe is not only “Western” Europe anymore; it is equally “Eastern” Europe as well. It is only natural that with the enlargement of the EU to include CEE countries, the position of the EU regarding issues of common past is changing. There are reasons to believe that this common position should only consolidate as Europe moves towards further integration and as CEE countries solidify their positions in the EU and learn to use to the full extent the opportunities membership in the EU provides. It is therefore likely that the EU will continue to move towards a more integrated appreciation of its common past and towards a common culture of remembrance.

The Importance of Common Conscience for European Integration

To push the argument further, it could be said that a common culture of remembrance in the EU is *necessary* for further European integration. Initially the EU was created to overcome the conflicts and the mistrust that pertained between different European countries. However, if the EU wants to move in the direction

¹⁷ “OSCE Resolution Equating Stalinism with Nazism Enrages Russia”, *European Dialogue* - <http://eurodialogue.org/OSCE-Resolution-Equating-Stalinism-With-Nazism-Enrages-Russia>

¹⁸ Dovid Katz, “Halting Holocaust Obfuscation”, *The Guardian*, 8 January 2010 - <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/08/holocaust-baltic-lithuania-latvia>

of a more pronounced political integration, the residual mistrust between some of the “old” member states and the “new” ones will have to be overcome.

In this case the differing historical interpretations serve as a source of residual mistrust. The “new” member states are frustrated that countries like Germany, France or Italy are still often reluctant to unequivocally condemn Stalinism, or to renounce the Russian interpretation of history in order not to upset Moscow. From the perspective of the newcomers, the Russian interpretation is nothing else but the Soviet one, which is full of falsifications and lies. It is only natural that, if any of the “old” member states still sympathize with this kind of interpretation, the post-Communist EU countries view them with significant suspicion.

According to the Danish academic of political science Ole Wæver, the essential element in the formation process of a political community based on a common identity is always defining “the Other”. According to Wæver, in the case of the EU, its Other is its tragic past¹⁹. With the 2004 enlargement of the EU, the debate became open again about what exactly European past is. From the perspective of the post-Communist EU countries, this past should not only be about the horrific wars of the 20th century or the crimes committed by the Nazis, but also about the division of Europe produced by the totalitarian policies of the communist Soviet Union. To follow Wæver’s argument, until there is a consensus in the EU about its past, a common political identity will be extremely fragile.

Indeed, the EP resolution of 2 April 2009 clearly notes this point by stating that “Europe will not be united unless it is able to form a common view of its history, recognises Nazism, Stalinism and fascist and Communist regimes as a common legacy and brings about an honest and thorough debate on their crimes in the past century”. It also goes on to define the commonly recognized Other when it says that “from the outset European integration has been a response to the suffering inflicted by two world wars and the Nazi tyranny that led to the Holocaust and to the expansion of totalitarian and undemocratic Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe”. Such statements of a European institution, directly elected by nearly 500 million of its citizens, give hope that a common European culture of remembrance is in the making.

¹⁹ Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press, 2003

Conclusions

With this opinion I have sought to deny the conclusion reached by Jeroen Bult in his article that a common culture of remembrance will not emerge in Europe in the foreseeable future. I do agree that a common culture of remembrance has still not developed in Europe, and I think the two most fundamental reasons for this are economic and political dependence on Russia and fears about the possible obfuscation of Holocaust. On the other hand, I challenge Bult's conclusion by demonstrating the apparent signs of an emerging pan-European conscience with regard to its tragic past.

The two major obstacles for a common culture of remembrance outlined in this paper are not permanent. The discussion about what kind of measures the EU needs to take to withstand Russian political and economic pressure merits a separate paper. Nonetheless, it is widely agreed by experts that more substantial EU integration in the area of energy would make it less vulnerable to pressures from external energy suppliers. A genuine European energy policy would therefore have an indirect effect on the emergence of a common culture of remembrance.

Concerns about the memory of Holocaust should also be addressed with conscious effort. For those who know the motives behind the leaders of the post-Communist CEE countries, it is clear that their efforts are not aimed at obfuscating Holocaust, but merely at reviving and giving a clear assessment of Stalin's crimes. In other words, currently there is a lack of understanding between the CEE countries and the wider Jewish community. However, only constructive and intensive dialogue can change the misperceptions. The CEE governments, including the Lithuanian government, should engage with Holocaust scholars as well as Jewish (not least those in Israel) activists to alleviate their concerns. Dialogue is needed not only among politicians, but among historians as well. After all, to paraphrase Jean-Francois Revel, victims of Nazism will be insulted if they are used to bury the memory of victims of Communism²⁰.

It is also inevitable that pressure for the convergence of views regarding Europe's past will come from within Europe, namely because of the need to abolish mistrust between the "old" and the "new" EU member states in order to be able to move ahead with deeper European integration. Europe will need to redefine its past as its Other to include the Communist crimes along the Nazi ones. Arguably,

²⁰ Jean-Francois Revel, *La Grande Parade*, Pocket, 2001

such efforts are already taking place and results are seen within pan-European organizations, such as the OSCE, the CoE, and the EU itself.

At the end of the day the division of Europe and Stalin's crimes have to be seen by common European publics as tragic pages in European history, comparable to those of WWII itself, or the Nazi occupations of Western European countries during WWII. Ultimately, this common culture of remembrance has to manifest itself in documents, statements, books and other public documents of each and every EU member state. Most importantly, it has to become an integral part of history classes taught at Western European schools. Only when German school-children are taught about Nazi atrocities alongside the Stalinist ones as parts of a common European experience, will we be able to say that a common culture of remembrance has taken root in the EU.