DRAFT OF

“Debating, Obfuscating and Disciplining the Holocaust: Post-Soviet Historical Discourses on the OUN-UPA and Other Nationalist Movements”

by

GRZEGORZ ROSSOLIŃSKI-LIEBE

The final version appeared in East European Jewish Affairs Vol 42, No 3, Dec. 2012, pp 199-241
Debating, Obfuscating and Disciplining the Holocaust: Post-Soviet Historical Discourses on the OUN–UPA and other Nationalist Movements

Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe*

Free University of Berlin, Germany

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union the archives of the former republics and satellite states of this multiethnic empire were opened. This allowed historians to investigate the history of nationalist and radical right organisations and armies that, during the Second World War, had been involved in the Holocaust and other atrocities. Among them was the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. For a long time the history of these movements was unknown or distorted by Soviet propaganda and propagandist publications written during the Cold War by veterans of these movements living in the West and cooperating with Western intelligence services. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was simultaneously accompanied by the “rebirth” of nationalism that was not free from antisemitism and racism, and which triggered different types of nationalist distortions of history and obfuscations of the Holocaust. Post-Soviet historical discourses were shaped not only by journalists or political activists, but also by radical right historians. These discourses impacted as well on historians who in general were critical of the post-Soviet rehabilitation of nationalism, war criminality or East Central European fascism. Concentrating on Ukrainian and Polish history, this article explores how the radical right historical discourses appeared in the post-Soviet space, what types of historians were involved in them and what kinds of distortions and obfuscations have predominated.

Keywords: Holocaust; Ukraine; antisemitism; Second World War; denial; obfuscation; East Central Europe; post-Soviet historical discourses; OUN; UPA; NSZ; AK; LAF; kresowiacy

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of new nation states considerably affected both Holocaust studies and our understanding of the Holocaust. After 1991 many of the hitherto inaccessible archives in the former Soviet republics and satellite states were opened. This made it possible to investigate a number of unknown, denied or mythologised aspects of the Second World War and the Holocaust. One important aspect of this development were the East Central European nationalist, ultranationalist or fascist organisations or armies that committed atrocities against Jews and other civilians or were involved in the Holocaust as collaborationist or non-collaborationist movements.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was simultaneously followed by the “rebirth” of nationalism that was not free from antisemitism and racism. This triggered different types of nationalist distortions of history and obfuscations of the Holocaust. In general, post-Soviet Holocaust denial has differed from Holocaust denial in the style of David

*Email: g.rossolinski-liebe@fu-berlin.de
In post-Soviet space, the Holocaust has not usually been denied as such and post-Soviet radical right activists did not question the existence of gas chambers in Auschwitz, or the anti-Jewish politics of Nazi Germany. Instead, nationalist post-Soviet discourses denied some of the national or regional elements of the Holocaust, like, for example, the contribution of different nationalist organisations or armies to it, or very frequently the participation of local populations in pogroms and other forms of anti-Jewish violence. A decade ago Michael Shafir commented on this phenomenon as follows:

Holocaust denial in post-Communist East Central Europe is a fact. And, like most facts, its shades are many. Sometimes, denial comes in explicit forms – visible and universally-aggressive. At other times, however, it is implicit rather than explicit, particularistic rather than universal, defensive rather than aggressive. And between these two poles, the spectrum is large enough to allow for a large variety of forms, some of which may escape the eye of all but the most versatile connoisseurs of country-specific history, culture, or immediate political environment.

Post-Communist denial was an aftermath of the Sovietisation of history. In the Soviet Union and its satellite states, national and radical right movements were an important part of Soviet propaganda, which exacerbated their crimes and named and shamed them for massacres that they did not perform. This had a substantial impact on the attitudes of the local intelligentsia, who claimed that, since these organisations and armies were anti-Soviet, they must have been democratic and were not involved in any massacres. Moreover, the movements became part of the national identity of the new states in “rebirth.” This merely strengthened the historical distortion of them which, consequently, saw them frequently beginning to appear in post-Soviet discourses as patriotic and heroic organisations and armies. As such, it was depicted that they only resisted the German and Soviet occupiers and that they were by no means involved in the Holocaust, other atrocities or collaboration with Germany. In this way the intelligentsia of the former Soviet republics and satellite states had made a second turn to the right, which to some extent resembled the first such turn in the 1920s and 1930s.

Although ideological post-Soviet discourses were manufactured and practised first of all by politicians, radical right activists and historians in the respective post-Soviet countries they also had an impact on foreign historians. Similar radical right historical discourses had already been produced during the Cold War by national émigrés who, like Petro Mirchuk the former head of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsia Ukrain’s’kykh Natsionalistiv, OUN) propaganda apparatus, lived in the West after the Second World War. Cold War discourses impacted on scholars working at Western universities, like John Armstrong, who in his study of Ukrainian nationalism did not investigate the involvement of the OUN in the pogroms in 1941, or the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia and eastern Galicia organised by the OUN-B and performed by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Ukrains’ka Povstans’ka Armiia, UPA).

In this paper, I will concentrate on post-Soviet historical discourses that present nationalist or ultranationalist organisations and armies as patriotic, heroic or even democratic movements without mentioning their involvement in the Holocaust, or marginalising and suppressing such facts. I will demonstrate how these discourses have been fashioned by radical right historians and how they have impacted upon critical historians. Hence, different types of scholars are analysed in this paper. They can be classified into at least five groups.
The first group of scholars to be discussed include Mirchuk, Wolodymyr Kosyk and Taras Hunczak, who were members of the OUN and who explained the history of the OUN–UPA whilst living in exile according to the official propaganda of this movement. Second, historians who were shaped by hegemonic national post-Soviet discourses, like Alexander Gogun, Volodymyr V’iatrovych and Ruslan Zabilyi, will be discussed. These historians prolonged the radical right discourses established by OUN émigrés and pushed a far right agenda under the cover of scholarship. The third group of historians include scholars like Iaroslav Hrytsak, who have tried to challenge the nationalist narrative, but repeatedly presented problematic approaches to the Holocaust in Ukraine. The fourth group constitute historians like John Paul-Himka and David Marples, who in the 1980s either denied or ignored or were not aware of the atrocities that had been committed by the OUN–UPA, but in the 1990s rethought their approach to the Holocaust in Ukraine and the war crimes committed by Ukrainian nationalists. Fifth, historians like Tarik Cyril Amar and Timothy Snyder are discussed, of whom Snyder in particular has investigated several important aspects of the Holocaust. These historians are in general critical towards nationalism or the post-Soviet rehabilitation of ultranationalism, but wittingly or unwittingly have made some omissions, or demonstrated other problematic approaches towards the subject.

This paper does not equate or even compare these very different types of historians. Its main aim is to demonstrate how radical right discourses on the OUN, UPA and other organisations or armies have been invented and how they have impacted upon academic writing about the above-mentioned movements and their involvement in the Holocaust.

The article concentrates on the OUN and UPA, but some other organisations and armies like the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK), the Lithuanian Activist Front (Lietuvos Aktyvistų Frontas, LAF), the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, NSZ) and the Russian Liberation Army (Ruskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armia, ROA) are also included. Due to the proscriptions of word limit, even the outline of the history of the OUN and UPA remains brief.

**The OUN and Ethnic and Political Violence During and Ater the Second World War**

The OUN was founded in Vienna in 1929 by Ukrainian veterans of the First World War. These people decided to organise themselves in order to continue the struggle for a Ukrainian state, which had not come into being after First World War. Firstly, in 1920 they established the Ukrainian Military Organisation (Ukraїns’ka Vis’kova Orhanizatsiia, UVO) in Prague, Czechoslovakia, which mainly became a terrorist and spy organisation and did not ultimately succeed in mobilising Ukrainian youth for a nationalist uprising against the Poles and Soviets, whom the Ukrainian nationalists regarded as illegitimate occupiers of Ukraine. The OUN succeeded in radicalising many more Ukrainians than the UVO, persuading the population to regard Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy as potential allies and convincing them that only the OUN and not a democratic Ukrainian party like the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (Ukraїns’ke Natsional’no- Demokratychne Obiednannia, UNDO) could establish a Ukrainian state. Not surprisingly, in the years just prior to the Second World War, the OUN became the most popular Ukrainian political organisation. Similar to radical right East Central European movements like the Croatian Ustaša, the Slovak Hlinka...
Party and the Romanian Iron Guard, the OUN adopted fascism, antisemitism, racism, the cult of war and a range of radical right values.4

After Nazi Germany’s attack on Poland on 1 September 1939, the Soviets incorporated the eastern parts of the Second Republic, whilst Nazi Germany occupied a significant part of the western and central territories of this multiethnic state. As a result, western Ukraine (eastern Galicia and Volhynia) was included in Soviet Ukraine. Afraid of Soviet power and enthusiastic about Nazi Germany, several hundred OUN members crossed the German–Soviet border and stayed in the General Government. Those who stayed in western Ukraine went underground or tried to come to terms with the prevailing political circumstances.5

At that time the OUN split into the OUN-M (leader Andrii Mel’nyk) and OUN-B (leader Stepan Bandera). Both factions collaborated with Nazi Germany, in particular its military intelligence department, the Abwehr. They were involved in the preparations for Operation Barbarossa and enjoyed the financial and infrastructural support of Germany. The OUN-B established two German battalions with Ukrainian soldiers, Nachtigall and Roland, with 350 and 330 soldiers, respectively, and recruited its members at the police academies in Kraków, Chełm and Rabka. The Security Service (Sluzhba Bezpeky, SB) of the OUN-B recruited its staff at the Security Police School in Zakopane.6 OUN-B members from western Ukraine crossed the German–Soviet border and participated in four-week-long military courses organised by the OUN-B and the Abwehr.7 All of these preparations were part of a greater plan, which the OUN-B called the “Ukrainian National Revolution.” Its purpose was to proclaim a Ukrainian state, like the Hlinka Party did in Slovakia (March 1939) and the Ustaša in Croatia (April 1941), and to become a part of the “New Europe” under the aegis of Nazi Germany.8

In April 1941, the OUN-B organised the Second Great Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in Kraków, at which it officially introduced the Führerprinzip and elected Bandera as the providnyk of the OUN-B who was supposed to become the providnyk or vozhd’ of the Ukrainian state. The OUN-B leadership adopted a number of fascist principles, including the salute of raising the right arm “slightly to the right, slightly above the peak of the head,” while calling out “Glory to Ukraine!” (Slava Ukraïni!) and responding “Glory to the Heroes!” (Heroiam Slava!); the authoritarian principle “one nation, one party, one leader” (odyn narid – odyn provid – odna vlada); and the red-and-black flag, which symbolised blood and earth (Blut und Boden).9 It officially declared Jews, Poles, Russians, Soviets and non-loyal Ukrainians to be the enemies of the Ukrainian nation and advised its members to destroy them if possible. In the document “The Struggle and Activity of the OUN in Wartime,” prepared by Stepan Bandera, Iaroslav Stets’ko, Stepan Lenkavs’kyi and Roman Shukhevych in spring 1941 for the OUN-B underground in Ukraine, we read, “During the time of chaos and confusion it is permissible to liquidate undesirable Polish, Muscovite [Russian or Soviet], and Jewish activists.”10

The OUN-B in the underground of the Soviet western Ukraine stayed in close contact with the OUN-B in the General Government. According to Ivan Klymiv, prior to the German attack on the Soviet Union, the OUN-B had 20,000 adults and 7000 young members in its ranks. After the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, OUN-B members emerged from the underground and started carrying out the advice of the OUN-B leadership. The situation was exacerbated by the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del, NKVD), which, according to Soviet documents, killed 8789 prisoners in Ukraine,
amongst them Ukrainians, Poles and Jews. The bodies of the victims were left in
the prisons. After 22 June 1941, pogroms occurred in several places as a result of
which more than 13,000 Jews were killed and many others humiliated, mistreated, or
raped. The OUN-B supported these anti-Jewish deeds. It incited the local population
to anti-Jewish violence and established a militia that assisted the Germans. In Lviv
the OUN-B militia cooperated with Einsatzkommandos 5 and 6 who shot the Jews.
The militia also assisted the Germans in the prison action during which Jews were
forced to remove the decomposing bodies of the NKVD victims from three prisons.
Many were severely beaten and even killed during this action by the Germans, militiamen
and crowds of onlookers.

Hitler did not accept the Ukrainian state proclaimed by Stets’ko. Bandera and
Stets’ko were arrested and kept in Berlin prisons, and Zellenbau, a building for political
prisoners in the concentration camp Sachsenhausen. A number of other OUN-B
members were also arrested and kept in several concentration camps as political prison-
ers until autumn 1944. The OUN-B in Ukraine went underground and remained in an
ambivalent relationship with the Germans until the spring of 1944, when it again began
collaborating with the Nazis. During the period of non-collaboration the OUN-B sent
members to the Ukrainian police, who assisted the Einsatzgruppen in the mass shooting
actions or helped the Germans to send the Jews from the ghettos to extermination
camps. In late 1942 and early 1943, the OUN-B took control of the Ukrainian Insurgent
Army established by Taras Bul’ba-Borovets’, and in early 1943 it started murdering
and forcing to leave the Ukrainian territories the Polish population in Volhynia and
in 1944 in eastern Galicia. As a result, between 70,000 and 100,000 Polish civilians
were murdered. Along with the systematic murder of the Polish population, the UPA
and the OUN-B hunted and killed Jews who escaped from ghettos and were hiding
in the forests. It also forced Jewish doctors and nurses to work for the UPA and estab-
lished camps in which Jewish civilians were forced to work. Before the arrival of
the Soviet army, the SB of the OUN-B killed a part of the Jews who stayed in the UPA.

During the three years of the German occupation of western Ukraine, the Germans
collaborated with the Ukrainian Central Committee (Ukrain’ski Tsentral’nyi Komitet,
UTsK) and members of the OUN-M. In 1943 and 1944, the Waffen-SS Division
Galizien, with 8000 Ukrainian soldiers, was established on the initiative of the
UTsK. The fourth police regiment murdered a few hundred Polish civilians in the
village of Huta Pieniacka shortly before it was included in the division. A number of
soldiers included in the Waffen-SS Galizien had committed war crimes in different
Schutzmannschaft battalions and other German units before they became Waffen-SS
soldiers. Waffen-SS Galizien recruits received two hours of education in National
Socialist Weltanschauung every week and swore to “give absolute obedience to the
Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces, Adolf Hitler.” The Waffen-SS
Galizien surrendered to the British Army in spring 1945. The majority of its soldiers
were, like other Ukrainians who had stayed after the Second World War in camps
for displaced persons in Germany and Austria, resettled to Australia, Canada, Great
Britain, the US and other Western countries in the late 1940s.

After the arrival of the Soviets in western Ukraine in summer 1944, the UPA con-
tinued to fight against them until early 1950, although year on year they were reduced to
ever smaller units hiding in the woods or in bunkers. In order to liquidate the nationalist
underground, the Soviets, in particular the NKVD (from 1946, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs – Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Del, MVD), applied drastic measures against
family members of the OUN–UPA and random Ukrainians. According to Soviet
documents, they killed in western Ukraine 153,000 people and arrested another 134,000. The majority of these people were killed in 1944–5. In addition, the Soviets, according to their own documents, deported 203,000 people from western Ukraine, of whom 171,000 were accused of belonging to or supporting the OUN–UPA. Altogether until 1953 about 490,000 western Ukrainians suffered under Soviet repressions, including murder, arrests and deportations. This terror affected almost every family in western Ukraine and had a significant impact on future western Ukrainian–Soviet relations. At the same time as the brutal conflict against the Soviets took place, the OUN and UPA killed about 20,000 civilians and 10,000 Soviet soldiers, including members of the destruction battalions or NKVD staff.

The Early Radical Right Wing Interpretations and Falsifications of OUN and UPA history

The OUN-B began falsifying its history of ethnic and political violence as early as 1943, the year in which with the help of the UPA it conducted ethnic cleansing in Volhynia. In late October 1943, OUN-B leaders ordered the preparation of statements that would confirm that the Germans had persecuted Jews in 1941 without any help from the Ukrainian militia. At the same time as falsifying its very recent history of violence and ethnic cleansing of the Ukrainian territories, it guaranteed minority rights in official propaganda leaflets to non-Ukrainian inhabitants of Ukraine and thereby also to the Poles whom it was annihilating en masse. The falsification of the record of its own ethnic violence was determined by its wish to begin collaboration with Great Britain and the US, who together with the Soviet Union were beginning to win the war against Nazi Germany.

In 1946, Mykola Lebed’ published UPA: Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Its Genesis, Rise and Deeds in the Struggle of the Ukrainian Nation for an Independent United State, in which he denied the involvement of the OUN-B in the pogroms in summer 1941, the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia and eastern Galicia in 1943 and 1944 and the killing of Jews by the UPA. Lebed’ succeeded Bandera as head of the OUN-B in 1941 and kept this position until May 1943. He left Ukraine in 1944 to establish contacts with Great Britain and the US. After the Second World War he collaborated with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and was one of the most influential Ukrainian Cold War political activists.

In his 1946 publication Lebed’ set up the standard manner of denying atrocities committed by the OUN and UPA. This was firstly carried out by claiming that the OUN and UPA were a patriotic, anti-Soviet and anti-German movement that struggled for the independence of Ukraine. Secondly, he portrayed the Jews and Poles as aggressors and the Ukrainian nationalists as the victims of the German and Soviet regimes.

Another influential Cold War radical right interpreter of the OUN and UPA history was Mirchuk, the head of the OUN propaganda apparatus in 1939. Mirchuk was a prolific writer. He wrote a number of books about the OUN and UPA, composed the first biography of the legendary leader of the OUN-B, Stepan Bandera, in the genre of hagiography (zhytta sviatykh) and described his own journey to Israel. It was on this journey that he tried to convince almost everyone he met and in particular the historians at Yad Vashem that Ukrainians, including OUN-B activists, were equally the victims of the Holocaust. He frequently showed his Auschwitz tattoo and claimed it was the best evidence for his arguments. Naturally, he never mentioned that he and other OUN-B members in Auschwitz had held the status of political prisoner and
that only a relatively small number of them did not survive the camp, while the vast majority of Jews in Auschwitz were killed there.\footnote{22}

Although Mirchuk might appear to be a bizarre exception among Ukrainian political Cold War émigrés, he was not a unique case at all. A number of other Ukrainian nationalist activists, amongst them many professors at universities in Canada, Germany, France and the US with a comparable biographical background to Mirchuk, represented similar values and collectively produced a powerful radical right and denial-oriented discourse on the OUN and UPA. These included: OUN-B member and professor at the Ukrainian Free University (UFU) in Munich, Wolodymyr Kosyk,\footnote{23} member of the OUN-B and after the war of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad (Orhanizatsia Ukraïns’kykh Natsionalistiv-zà kordonom, OUN-z) and professor at UFU, Ivan Hryn’okh;\footnote{24} OUN-B leader between 1968 and 1986 and leader of the ABN between 1945 and 1986, Iaroslav Stets’ko;\footnote{25} OUN-B member and prolific producer of historical memoirs, Mykola Klymyshyn;\footnote{26} OUN-B member Stepan Lenkav’s’kyi;\footnote{27} OUN-B leader Stepan Bandera;\footnote{28} OUN member and rector of UFU from 1968 until 1986, Volodymyr Ianiv;\footnote{29} the already mentioned Mykola Lebed’; the OUN-B member Roman Ilnyts’kyi;\footnote{30} OUN member, professor at Rutgers University (in the US) and author of numerous publications on the OUN, UPA and Waffen-SS Galizien, Taras Hunczak;\footnote{31} UPA insurgent, editor of the monumental archival anthology Litopys UPA and professor at McMaster University (Canada), Petro Potichnyj;\footnote{32} Waffen-SS Galizien veteran Vasyl’ Veryha;\footnote{33} Waffen-SS Galizien veteran and professor at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main from 1965 to 1982, Oleksa Horbatsch;\footnote{34} Waffen-SS Galizien veteran and rector of UFU from 1993 to 1995, Roman Drazhn’ovs’kyi;\footnote{35} and Waffen-SS Galizien veteran and chancellor of the University of Alberta (Canada) from 1982 to 1986, Petro Savaryn.\footnote{36}

The discourse produced by these individuals and other émigrés portrayed the OUN, UPA and the Waffen-SS Galizien as a patriotic and democratic “liberation movement.”\footnote{37} The atrocities committed by them, in particular OUN’s involvement in the pogroms of 1941, the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia in 1943 and eastern Galicia in 1944, the murdering of Jews by the UPA in 1943–4 and the murdering of “non-loyal” Ukrainians during the conflict with the Soviets did not appear in their discourse. Ukrainian nationalists simultaneously published falsified documents in order to conceal and obliterate the violent and fascist nature of the OUN. For example, in 1955 the OUN reprinted in the document anthology The OUN in the Light of the Resolutions of Great Congresses the resolutions of the Second Great Congress of OUN in Kraków in April 1941 at which the OUN adopted the fascist salute of raising the right arm “slightly to the right, slightly above the peak of the head” while saying “Glory to Ukraine!” (Slava Ukraïni!) and answering “Glory to the Heroes!” (Heroiam Slava!). The 1955 publication omitted this particular part of the text.\footnote{37}

Another interesting example of not only falsifying but also celebrating falsified documents is the text of the proclamation of the Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941. The falsified version of this document was republished for many years shortly before the 30 June anniversary in several Ukrainian radical right newspapers, including the Toronto-based Homin Ukraïny, the London-based Ukraïns’ka dumka and the Munich-based Shliakh peremohy, as well as journals like Vyzvol’nyi shliakh and the ABN Correspondence. The phrases of admiration for Hitler and the expressions of desire for close collaboration with the “National Socialist Greater Germany that under the leadership of Adolf Hitler is creating a new order in Europe” were always
left out. The incomplete document was then celebrated as a brave, anti-German act of the “renewal of Ukrainian statehood.”

The radical right discourse on the OUN, UPA and the Waffen-SS Galizien became so persistent, omnipresent and self-evident that in the 1980s even people who in the 1990s would begin to critically investigate the OUN and UPA, like John-Paul Himka and David Marples, regarded the OUN-B and in particular the UPA as a “liberation movement” and ignored or denied its antisemitic and ultranationalist nature. In an article published in *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe* in 1982 about the opposition in Ukraine, Himka characterised the UPA as “an anti-Nazi and subsequently anti-Soviet resistance force” and did not mention any atrocities committed by it or the OUN. In an article published in 1985 in the *Ukrainian Weekly*, David Marples euphemised the OUN and UPA crimes against Jews, Poles, non-nationalist Ukrainians and Russians, claiming that “some undisciplined actions on the part of an armed group were almost inevitable.” He then claimed that the UPA was a multicultural force: “according to a Western source, the nationality groups within the [UPA’s] ranks included Azerbaijans, Uzbeks, Tatars and Jews.”

**The Post-Soviet Nationalist Reinterpretations**

The dissidents and nationalist activists of the late 1980s did not invent the radical right denial-oriented narratives, as previously mentioned, but took them over from publications produced by the OUN-B, ZCh OUN, OUN-z and other émigré organisations. This material went to Ukraine through different channels. One of these channels was facilitated by scholars like John-Paul Himka, who went to Ukraine in the 1970s and 1980s to work in the archives and socialise with the local intelligentsia. The anti-Communist publications that Himka distributed among western Ukrainian intellectuals were reproduced by the OUN-z. Their production and distribution in Ukraine might have been part of the OUN-z Cold War programme Prolog founded and sponsored by the CIA. The OUN-z, like all other factions of the OUN, regarded OUN members, UPA insurgents, Waffen-SS Galizien soldiers or collaborators like Kubiiovych, who was involved in the aryanisation of Jewish property, as freedom fighters or national heroes. It denied or ignored the atrocities committed by the OUN and UPA, their involvement in the Holocaust and their collaboration with Nazi Germany. Another way to familiarise Ukrainian dissidents with radical right denial-oriented narrative was the smuggling of such works as Bandera’s collection of articles *Perspectives of the Ukrainian Revolution* inside the covers of *From the History of the Collectivization of Agriculture in the Western Oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR* and trying to include them in library catalogues.

Many of the publications produced in the West during the Cold War by the OUN, UPA and Waffen-SS Galizien veterans indicated above were reprinted in Ukraine after 1991. Some of the Cold War newspapers and journals founded by OUN émigrés, like *Shliakh peremohy* or *Vyzvol’nyi shliakh*, were relocated to Ukraine. Historians in western Ukraine generally accepted the radical right and denial-oriented narrative. In contrast to Soviet discourse, the new ultranationalist narrative appeared to be democratic, critical and true to both older historians trained in the canon of Marxism–Leninism and younger historians who began their university education after 1991. It is very likely that the majority of them did not realise that the new interpretation of the OUN and UPA history was invented by OUN, UPA and Waffen-SS Galizien veterans during the Cold War. In addition some of the radical right OUN-B émigré historians opened academic institutes in Ukraine to promote their version of history.
Volodymyr V’iatrovych and the Institute for the Study of the Liberation Movement

The most prolific and influential institute opened by the OUN-B in Ukraine has been the Institute for the Study of the Liberation Movement (Tsentr doslidzhen’ vyzvol’noho rukhu, TsDVR). It is located in the building of the Academy of Sciences at 4 Kozel’nyts’ka Street, in Lviv. The employees of the institute, on the one hand, republish radical right denial-oriented works written by OUN, UPA and Waffen-SS Galizien veterans and, on the other, produce their own works in the narrative invented by the nationalist émigrés. The most prolific historian of the TsDVR is Volodymyr V’iatrovych. Like Mirchuk before him, V’iatrovych has produced a number of monographs and articles about the heroic and patriotic nature of the Ukrainian nationalists. In his publications V’iatrovych portrays the OUN and UPA as a “national liberation” movement and claims that they did not collaborate with Nazi Germany but only opposed German and Soviet imperialism. Also like Mirchuk and other OUN, UPA and Waffen-SS Galizien veterans, V’iatrovych has denied the majority of war crimes and atrocities committed by the OUN and UPA.

After Victor Iushchenko became the president of Ukraine in January 2005 and established the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory (Ukrains’kyi instytut natsional’noïpam’iati, UINP) in 2006 in Kiev, V’iatrovych became the director of the archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy, SBU) and in turn one of the most authoritative state historians. During Iushchenko’s presidency, V’iatrovych’s narrative, and therefore also that of the OUN, UPA and Waffen-SS Galizien veterans, was promoted as the official national narrative of Ukrainian history. Ihor Iukhnovs’kyi, the head of the UINP, commented on one of V’iatrovych’s books, The Ukrainian Insurgent Army: The Army of the Undefeated, in a typical post-Soviet style:

The book in front of you is written by authors who belong to a new generation of Ukrainian historians, and offers a full account of the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. I am convinced that every Ukrainian citizen who reads it will be convinced that our people are not only good, beautiful and hard working, but also heroic. The reader will be convinced that independence came to us as a result of a long, heroic struggle. Read this book. Looking at the faces of the heroes of the UPA, you possibly also find your own likeness.

One of V’iatrovych’s most popular publications has been the 140-page book entitled The Attitude of the OUN to the Jews. The Formation of a Position in Light of a Catastrophe. Himka and Taras Kurylo commented on the methodology that V’iatrovych used in this publication:

V’iatrovych manages to exonerate the OUN of charges of antisemitism and complicity in the Holocaust only by employing a series of highly dubious procedures: rejecting sources that compromise the OUN, accepting uncritically censored sources from émigré OUN circles, failing to recognize antisemitism in OUN texts, limiting the source base to official OUN proclamations and decisions, excluding Jewish memoirs, refusing to consider contextual and comparative factors, failing to consult German document collections, and ignoring the mass of historical monographs on his subject written in the English and German languages.

In the entire monograph V’iatrovych introduced only one critical article on OUN’s antisemitism and its involvement in the pogroms, written by Berkhoff and Carynnyk, but then merely dismissed it with the claim that it reminds him of Soviet publications. Instead, he claimed that Hunczak had delivered the best research on this subject and
repeated Hunczak’s assertion that the stereotype of “Judaeo-Bolshevism” was not a stereotype but reality.\textsuperscript{50}

Similarly, V’iatrovych introduced several documents in which OUN members like Lenkavs’kyi argued that “regarding the Jews we will adopt any methods that lead to their destruction” or in which the OUN distanced itself from anti-Jewish violence, only to subsequently claim that they are “falsification with the purpose of provocation.”\textsuperscript{51} In this light, it might not be a surprise that V’iatrovych denied OUN participation in the pogroms in July 1941 and that the UPA murdered Jews hiding in the woods, or forced them to work for them.\textsuperscript{52} Furthermore, V’iatrovych not only denied the OUN’s and UPA’s murder of Jews, but also equated the fate of the OUN with the Jews by publishing pictures of a row of young men, who according to the caption are OUN members shot by Germans, next to pictures of a mass grave containing bodies of Jews.\textsuperscript{53}

Along with denying that the OUN and UPA killed Jews, V’iatrovych devoted a good deal of space to arguing that Jews working for the UPA were actually rescued by the UPA. To substantiate this claim he provided few, altogether no more than 10, testimonies of Jews who survived their time with the UPA. He omitted to mention that Jews survived the UPA mainly by accident or while hiding and waiting for the Red Army, or by escaping to the Red Army. He also ignored the fact that the SB of the OUN-B issued orders to liquidate Jews shortly before the arrival of the Red Army.\textsuperscript{54}

One of the very few Jews “rescued” by the UPA introduced by V’iatrovych was Stella Krentsbach, more than likely a fictional person. Her testimony of how she survived the UPA as a nurse was published by the ex-head of the OUN propaganda apparatus, Mirchuk. Given the one-sided and apologetic narrative of the “testimony” it seems to have been written by a Ukrainian nationalist and not a Jew who had actually survived in the UPA.\textsuperscript{55} Similarly, V’iatrovych proudly introduced information on Shukhevych’s wife, Natalia Shukhevych, who helped a Jewish girl in 1942–3, taken from accounts by two UPA leaders, Vasyl Kuk and Roman Shukhevych. In line with this he did not mention that the Nachtigall battalion, in which Shukhevych was a chief OUN liaison and political officer, according to Viktor Khar’kiv “Khmara,” a soldier from this battalion, “shot in two villages all the Jews met there” in 1941 or that in 1943 and 1944 the UPA with Shukhevych as its commander-in-chief killed several hundred Jews.\textsuperscript{56}

In a fashion not very different from the denial of anti-Jewish violence, V’iatrovych also denied anti-Polish violence, in particular the ethnic cleansing of Volhynia in 1943 and in eastern Galicia in 1944. In an article about the goals of the TsDVR, V’iatrovych repeated the rhetoric of OUN propaganda from the 1930s and 1940s, while applying it to the present:

Today we perceive the assault of anti-Ukrainian forces which try in many different ways to portray members of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement as villains. Especially the Polish pseudo-historians, who published a lot of “research” on the Polish victims from the hands of the Banderites, make themselves conspicuous in this regard. Unfortunately until today there was no adequate reaction to these publications by Ukrainian scholars.\textsuperscript{57}

It is hard to guess whom V’iatrovych identified as the “Polish pseudo-historians,” but one of the leading historians working on the UPA, Grzegorz Motyka, is Polish and has published his works in Polish.
The Democratic Nature of the Russian Nationalist Movement and the Rescue of Jews by the OUN and UPA

Unlike V’iatrovych, Alexander Gogun has published a few well-researched and critical works on Soviet partisans. Yet in contrast to these publications Gogun’s approach to the OUN and UPA does not really differ substantially from V’iatrovych’s or that of the TsDVR. Perhaps because of Gogun’s vehement anti-Sovietism and anti-Communism his valuable research on Soviet partisans does not correlate with his writings on the OUN and UPA.

Like V’iatrovych, Gogun has published material on the UPA’s attitude to the Jews. Together with the TsDVR-associated historian Oleksandr Vovk, Gogun wrote, “Jews in the Struggle for an Independent Ukraine,” first published in the journal Korni. Like a number of his other articles and his monograph, it was republished on the radical right website OUN–UPA, on which one can also find several articles and books by Mirchuk, V’iatrovych and several other nationalist historians.

In the article “Jews in the Struggle for an Independent Ukraine,” Gogun and Vovk gave the impression that Jews served and fought willingly and enthusiastically in the UPA for an independent Ukrainian state and that anti-Jewish violence performed by the UPA was marginal and accidental. As early as the beginning of the article they cast doubt on the antisemitic component behind the Ukrainian ultranationalist ideology, the pogroms of 1941 and the killing of Jews by Ukrainian policemen with a typical post-Soviet reference to the “stereotypes of Soviet propaganda”:

Writing about the Ukrainian–Jewish relations in the twentieth century every historian faces the problem of attitude of Jews to the national-liberation movement of the Ukrainians. Usually the descriptions of it are based on stereotypes of the Soviet propaganda: pogroms, Ukrainian nationalist anti-Semites, the participation of Ukrainian policemen in the Holocaust etc.

The phrase “the attitude of Jews to the national-liberation movement” is typical of radical right argumentation. It implies that the violence of a nationalist movement is not supposed to be the main problem of enquiry, but rather the “attitude of Jews” to the violent and antisemitic movement.

Gogun and Vovk did not deny that the UPA was formed by the OUN-B, but they diminished the radical right and fascist nature of this organisation, the collaboration with Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941 and again in 1944 and 1945 and its involvement in ethnic and political violence. They also claimed that the OUN-B abandoned antisemitism altogether in 1942. As evidence they provided a resolution passed at an OUN-B conference in April 1942 which actually confirms that the OUN-B was aware of its “negative attitude toward Jews”:

Despite [our] negative attitude toward Jews as a tool of Russian Bolshevik imperialism we do not think it expedient at the present moment in the international situation to take part in anti-Jewish actions in order to avoid becoming a blind tool in alien hands and turning the attention of the masses away from the main enemies.

The authors did not specify when exactly in 1942, at which conference, under which circumstances and for what reasons the OUN-B passed this resolution. They quote it mainly to argue that the OUN-B changed their attitude towards Jews and that the UPA fought only against the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Poland for an
independent Ukrainian state. The fact that the OUN-B’s and UPA’s attitude towards Jews might have something in common with its attitude to Poles, of whom they killed, according to Motyka, between 70,000 and 100,000 in 1943 and 1944, did not attract Gogun’s and Vovk’s attention. Similarly, it did not attract their attention that the leading OUN-B member Lenkavskyi claimed during the Ukrainian National Revolution in 1941, which also took place at the time of the pogroms, that “regarding the Jews we will adopt any methods that lead to their destruction.” Likewise, they manage to ignore that the proclaimer of the Ukrainian state, Stets’ko, claimed in his autobiography, written in Berlin shortly after the pogrom, to “support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like.”

Such omissions in information and documents are astonishing given the fact that Gogun’s publications on the Soviet partisans are written on the basis of documents from the same archives that hold the document collections on OUN-B’s ultranationalist nature and on the ethnic and political violence conducted by the OUN-B and UPA. This means that Gogun worked with these collections of documents, but did not take notice of OUN-B’s antisemitic propaganda, the murdering of Jews during the pogroms in 1941 or the liquidation of Jewish ghetto survivors by the UPA and the Ukrainian police. Instead, he used only some of the documents to promote the radical right image of the OUN-B and UPA established after the Second World War by the veterans of those units.

Gogun’s and Vovk’s denial of the murdering of Jews by the UPA resembles the ritualised denial applied by V’iatrovych and Mirchuk. Gogun and Vovk did not introduce any documents that confirm that the UPA and the SB of the OUN-B murdered Jews shortly before the coming of the Red Army to western Ukraine. They introduce documented cases of Jewish physicians in the UPA, but did not ask how Jewish physicians, nurses and other Jewish personnel got into the UPA, whether they were threatened or forced and in particular whether they survived working for the UPA. In the entire article they refer to only one document about two Jewish physicians who were killed by the UPA partisans, but then in conclusion they argue, “However, we can ascertain the fact of the participation of Jews in the Ukrainian national liberation movement of the Ukrainian nation in the 1940s.”

As such, they arrive at exactly the same point made after the Second World War by OUN-B and UPA émigrés, who during the Cold War massively denied their own involvement in the Holocaust and promoted themselves as anti-Soviet and anti-German freedom fighters. The main difference between denying UPA involvement in the Holocaust during the Cold War and in the post-Soviet period is the fact that after 1991 the archives that hold information on the relevant issues were open to historians and Gogun and Vovk are historians who should actually have reviewed these documents. Yet Gogun and Vovk prefer to focus on denial-oriented émigré publications like Lebed’s UPA: Ukrainian Insurgent Army from 1946, than on the relevant archival documents. The only critical remark they make of Lebed’s publications is, “Maybe, Lebed” embellished a little the Ukrainian-Jewish cooperation with a propagandist goal but the participation of the Jews in the UPA is a definite historical fact.”

The authors finished their article in a no less problematic manner than they began it. It ends with the statement that in the 1940s Jews served in the “Polish Home Army, Vlasov’s army, partisan Jewish units, Red Army, Wehrmacht, and the collaborationist Jewish police – yes there was also such a [police]. The UPA became not an exception, it fought for an independent Ukraine – against Hitler and Stalin.” Thereby Gogun and
Vovk detected Jews in armies involved in the Holocaust in order to claim that they rescued Jews like the UPA. This approach, on the one hand, equates the Wehrmacht with the Jewish police and, on the other, rehabilitates those armies.  

In an article on Andrei Vlasov’s ROA entitled “Jews in the Russian Liberation Movement,” also republished on the ultranationalist website OUN–UPA, Gogun made his radical right views even more explicit. He claimed, “Vlasov’s movement was a democratic movement.” Gogun’s best evidence for this assumption was a few non-Russian soldiers whom he uncovered by means of Kirill Aleksandov’s monograph about the ROA. Among these non-Russian soldiers in the ROA, Gogun especially emphasised the presence of three Jews who, according to him, are proof of the democratic nature of the ROA. Trying to understand this reasoning, one can only guess that for Gogun, like other radical right interpreters of the collaborationist, nationalist or fascist movement, everything anti-Soviet is democratic. In line with this logic, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini also appear to be democrats, since they too were anti-Soviet and anti-Communist.

In addition to portraying the OUN, UPA and ROA as democratic or multicultural, in their publications and speeches Gogun and Alexandrov opted for the rehabilitation of the leaders of these movements. Alexandrov argued in an article about Bandera that he, as a “Muscovite historian,” could not criticise Bandera and the OUN–UPA because their nature was distorted by Soviet stereotypes. He claimed that a critical investigation of Bandera and his movement is less important than the refutation of Soviet myths. Yet, through the negation of Soviet myths about Bandera, Alexandrov introduced Bandera as a Ukrainian hero who deserves to be honoured like Vlasov or Hitler in neo-Nazi circles.

Two days before Bandera’s hundredth birthday anniversary and the fiftieth anniversary of his death, Gogun delivered a speech in the Berlin Memorial Library of the Victims of Communism and Stalinism on the Ukrainian ultranationalist politician. The text of Gogun’s published speech resembles the argumentation of his articles. At the beginning, Gogun compared the era after 11 September 2001 to the era after Bandera’s assassination on 15 October 1959. Introducing Bandera, he emphasized that his name means “flag” or “banner” in Italian and Polish and that for an “Eastern European he [Bandera] is a real symbol of the radical followers of the independence of Ukraine.” Like his other articles, there was no information about the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN or the UPA although we find information about UPA’s anti-Polish and detailed information about UPA’s anti-Soviet violence.

In his monograph Between Hitler and Stalin. The Ukrainian Insurgents, also republished on the ultranationalist website OUN–UPA, Gogun did not include any information on the pogroms in 1941 or on the murder of Jews by the UPA. Instead, we find pictures of nationalist memorial plaques, such as for the proclamation of the Ukrainian state on 30 June 1941, a monument for Roman Shukhevych and a foundation stone for the Stepan Bandera monument in Lviv. There would be nothing wrong with publishing such photographs in an academic monograph if the author had critically commented on them and explained their propagandistic nature. Yet Gogun did this neither in the captions nor in the content of the book. Thus, the reader is actually advised by the author that the erecting of monuments for politicians like Stepan Bandera or war criminals like Roman Shukhevych is a normal outcome of history.

**Exposure and Denial**

While working on the last chapter of my dissertation “Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Fascist, 1909–2009,” I explored radical right presentations...
of Bandera on the internet. On the ultranationalist website *OUN–UPA*, amongst books and articles of historians like V’iatrovych and Mirchuk, I discovered Alexander Gogun’s publications. This surprised me because I knew Gogun’s works on the Soviet partisans, which appeared to me to be scholarly and well researched. Reading several of Gogun’s publications on the website *OUN–UPA*, I realised that Gogun’s publications on the OUN and the UPA fitted well into the post-Soviet radical right narrative and were not accidentally republished on this website. I decided to write a short article on Gogun’s and Vovk’s *Jews in the Struggle for an Independent Ukraine*, which was posted on the forum *DefendingHistory.com*. Gogun responded to my article and later to a brief response written by the *DefendingHistory.com* editor, Dovid Katz.

In his first response, published on 23 August 2011, Gogun argued that because of new archival “discoveries and the works of colleagues that have appeared recently” he would today write his article differently than he had done in 2004 and 2005. After 2005, several important works on the Ukrainian Holocaust and the OUN–UPA indeed appeared, but academic publications on the pogroms of 1941 and on the anti-Jewish violence of the UPA were available years before 2004. For example, in 1996 Dieter Pohl’s monograph on the German occupation of eastern Galicia came out. In 1999 Karel Berkhoff and Marco Carynnyk published an article in *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* on Stets’ko’s antisemitic autobiography of 1941. In 2001 Hans Heer’s article on the pogrom in Lviv appeared in *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, and a year later, in the same journal, Bernd Boll’s article on the pogrom in Zlochiv. This suggests that one could have found information on the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN and UPA if one had looked for it, rather than following the radical right denial-oriented discourse established by OUN émigrés.

Actually publications on the pogrom in Lviv had appeared shortly after the end of the Second World War and articles on the anti-Jewish violence of the UPA appeared during the Cold War in the 1950s. Their authors did not know exactly to what degree the OUN was involved in the pogroms, since they had no access to OUN documents from Soviet archives, but they were clear about the fact that the Ukrainian nationalists were involved in anti-Jewish violence. For example, in 1945 the historian Philip Friedman published *Destruction of the Lviv Jews* and in 1958 *Ukrainian–Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation*. In addition, a number of survivor memoirs, several of which also confirmed the involvement of Ukrainian nationalists in anti-Jewish violence, began appearing as early as 1945. Yet these publications have been labelled as anti-Ukrainian propaganda by the powerful radical right discourse established by the Ukrainian émigrés. This discourse was backed by the anti-Soviet politics of the Cold War. Lebed’s *UPA: Ukrainian Insurgent Army* was considered by nationalist and radical right historians to be more reliable than the memoirs of Holocaust survivors or for example Friedman’s publication, although Friedman was a historian and not a nationalist political activist involved in the atrocities committed by the OUN and UPA.

Similarly, Gogun claimed in his response that in his other publications he does not ignore the Jewish question and the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN–UPA. Yet if one consults his publications it can be seen that this is not true. In the monograph *Between Hitler and Stalin. The Ukrainian Insurgents*, his talk on Bandera in 2009 or in his last monograph on partisans in Ukraine, Gogun omitted the pogroms of 1941 although they are a central event for the subject of those three publications.

In addition to claiming the non-existence of relevant publications and omitting relevant facts in his other publications Gogun claimed that one cannot rely on survivor
testimonies quoted by other historians. He argued that my work “generously cite[s] indirect testimonies of politically biased third parties.” Yet the testimonies I quoted were introduced by Friedman in his article “Ukrainian–Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation.” Friedman introduced them in the context of forcing Jews to work for the UPA and murdering them before the coming of the Red Army. The credibility of testimonies introduced by Friedman is confirmed by other documents, like the SB orders to liquidate Jews before the coming of the Soviet army. It is also confirmed by a number of other Jewish testimonies.75

By disapproving of “indirect testimonies of politically biased third parties,” Gogun referred perhaps not only to Friedman, but also to Franziska Burder, who in her monograph introduced testimonies from the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. I quoted her monograph too. Gogun’s disapproval was further expressed in his claim that I am only a “diligent PhD candidate of the subject” and that my “knowledge … leaves room for improvement.” Likewise he could not decide whether his article is academic or not. First he referred to his article as a “popular scientific article,” but a few lines later he did not agree with my placing the word “academic” in quotations marks when referring to his article.76

Gogun’s attitude to historians who quote documents that do not confirm nationalist biases resembles Viatrovich’s disapproval of Richard Breitman and Norman J.W. Goda’s publication Hitlerr’s Shadow, Nazi War Criminals, U.S. Intelligence, and the Cold War, which contains one chapter on OUN collaboration with Western intelligence services after the Second World War. Breitman and Goda introduced documents from the National Archives and Records Administration in Washington, DC that do not confirm the biases established by the radical right discourse on the OUN and the UPA. In reaction to this publication, V’iatrovich’s claimed that Breitman and Goda had revived “old communist stereotypes.”77

Denying the radical right character of the website OUN–UPA, which, as already mentioned, presents mainly nationalist publications, was another important strategy applied by Gogun. In his first response he claimed that the website is an “amateur history website about Ukrainian nationalism.” Moreover, he expressed no objection to publishing his articles on this website. Yet after Dovid Katz more explicitly criticised the ultranationalist character of the website and the political and ideological intentions of its creators, Gogun changed his argument. He stopped insisting that the OUN–UPA website is an “amateur history website about Ukrainian nationalism” and claimed that his publications were abused by some “evil-doers.” Subsequently, however, and until the time of writing, Gogun’s publications have not been removed from the OUN–UPA website nor has he, to my knowledge, published a statement confirming that his articles and monograph on the OUN–UPA website were published without his agreement.78

One final, important observation on Gogun’s denial-oriented responses is that he did not change his attitude to the Holocaust and the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN–UPA during the process of discussing of his texts on Defending-History.com. This would require him to distance himself from his radical right publications, recognise the fact that he wrote them under the influence of the radical right denial-oriented discourse and re-evaluate his attitude to the Holocaust and the OUN and UPA’s anti-Jewish violence rather than continue to protect his problematic publications and denial.

Gogun’s and V’iatrovich’s views were promoted by Ukrainian academic institutes founded during the Cold War at North American universities. Both historians received fellowships from the Harvard Institute of Ukrainian Studies (HURI). V’iatrovich was also invited by the HURI at least twice, on 8 December 2010 and on 9 May 2012, to
deliver lectures at the institute. To my knowledge the directors of the institute have never commented on V’iatrovych’s obfuscation of Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust or his distortion of the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia and eastern Galicia, which he presents as a part of a “Polish–Ukrainian war.” Also the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (CIUS) in Edmonton hosted V’iatrovych in November 2010. Like the HURI it did not comment on his denial-oriented and obfuscating agenda or explain why it had decided to invite him. Moreover in October 2012 both institutes invited Ruslan Zabilyi whose article on the proclamation act of 30 June 1941 is discussed below. Zabilyi’s lecture trip through North America was organized and sponsored by Ukrainian Canadian Congress, League of Ukrainian Canadians, League of Ukrainian Canadian Women, Ukrainian Youth Association of Canada, Society of Veterans of UPA, and the OUN-B newspaper “Ukrainian Echo.”

Iaroslav Stetsko’s Autobiography

To some extent, Gogun’s denial resembles another very disturbing incident that occurred a decade earlier. In 1999, Marco Carynnyk and Karel Berkhoff published the above-mentioned article in which they examined a brief autobiography written by Iaroslav Stets’ko after he had been arrested and taken on 11 July 1941 to Berlin, where he then stayed under house arrest. Stets’ko’s autobiography contains significant information about his worldview and values. In his autobiography Stets’ko wrote,

Although I consider Moscow, which in fact held Ukraine in captivity, and not Jewry, to be the main and decisive enemy, I nonetheless fully appreciate the undeniably harmful and hostile role of the Jews, who are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine. I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like.

Writing this, Stets’ko repeated what he had claimed in his article “We and Jewry” (“Zhydivstvo i my”) published on 3 May 1939 in Novyi shliakh under the pseudonym Zynovii Karbovych.

Although very carefully researched and professionally written, Carynnyk’s and Berkhoff’s article caused confusion amongst radical right historians, who for decades had denied Stets’ko’s and the OUN’s ultranationalist and antisemitic convictions. In 2001, Hunczak published a commentary and in 2003 Kosyk published a second in Ukrainian Liberation Movement, a journal of the TsDVR. Hunczak questioned the authenticity of the document and Kosyk denied it. Both claimed that the document is or may be a Soviet forgery. Besides this, Hunczak and Kosyk defended Stets’ko and the OUN-B and partially denied and partially rationalised their ultranationalist and antisemitic views without providing evidence that could confirm their claims. In addition, Hunczak repeated the claim about the UPA rescuing Jews without mentioning the antisemitic elements in OUN ideology and the anti-Jewish violence performed by the Ukrainian nationalists during the Second World War. Finally, like V’iatrovych, Kosyk called Carynnyk’s and Berkhoff’s piece a “pseudoscientific article.”

Iaroslav Hrytsak and Ignacy Chiger’s Memoir World in Darkness

Another incident that bears resemblance to the two mentioned above is Iaroslav Hrytsak’s review of Ignacy Chiger’s memoir World in Darkness. The Memoir of the Girl in
a Green Sweater (Świat w mroku. Pamiętnik dziewczynki ojca w zielonym sweterku), published on 17 February 2012 in Ukraina moderna. Reviewing Chiger’s memoir, Hrytsak did not mention the pogrom in Lviv, although the author of the memoir, like many other Jewish survivors from Lviv, recalled this traumatic event. In my review of Chiger’s memoir and its reception in Ukraine, published three months after Hrytsak’s review in Ab Imperio, I pointed out this omission. In addition, I also explained the problematic equating of the Soviet and Nazi regimes and the uncritical review of the Jewish and Ukrainian police which Hrytsak undertook with the memoir’s help.85

In a response to my review Hrytsak did not admit to having done anything incorrect. Instead, he introduced himself as someone who engages “in developing Jewish Studies in two leading Ukrainian universities – the National University Kyiv–Mohyla Academy and the Ukrainian Catholic University” – and who in “public statements [has] consistently stated that Ukrainians must first acknowledge their role in the Holocaust before embarking on any sensible discussions about the Holocaust.”86 Then he claimed that he did not “focus on the Lviv pogrom of summer 1941” because “this event has already been covered by Ukrainian Internet media and much discussed. Therefore, I presumed that potential Ukrainian readers were aware of that story, and could contextualise this moment in Chiger’s memoirs by themselves.” Yet, given the fact that the pogroms in Ukraine and, in particular, the involvement of the local population in those events have been neglected by the Ukrainian media and barely discussed by Ukrainian intellectuals, Hrytsak’s statement is mystifying. It is even more questionable “how potential Ukrainian readers” who did not read Chiger’s memoir and know from their school education or from the post-Soviet denial-oriented discourses that Ukrainians did not participate in the pogroms and any other Holocaust-related events would know that in his memoir Chiger described the involvement of the local population in the pogrom.87

In his response, Hrytsak, like Gogun, not only rejected any responsibility for what he wrote, but also claimed that both he and Chiger were victims of my “arbitrary reading.” He argued that he did not equate the Soviet and Nazi regime with the help of Chiger’s memoir and that his description of the Jewish and Ukrainian police is not problematic.88 Instead of discussing the subject-related questions, he focused on blaming me for raising these questions and working on the OUN, UPA and the Holocaust in Ukraine. He claimed that my “intervention into Ukrainian professional and public debates proves to be counterproductive” and insinuated thereby that I should rather allow him and other historians to obfuscate the Holocaust or deny the pogroms and other Holocaust-related events as they have done for the last two decades.89 He also argued that I am responsible for the “scandal” around my lecture trip to Ukraine, organised in February and March 2012 by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, German Academic Exchange Service and the German embassy in Kiev.90 The lectures were prevented by the ultranationalist Svoboda party and by intellectuals in Ukraine who, although in general critical of Svoboda, supported the aims of the party and used similar arguments. Two of these historians were Vasyl’ Rasevych and Pavlo Solod’ko. Like the radical right Svoboda activists, Rasevych called me a “propagandist” and claimed that nobody has ever read my articles published in various leading scholarly journals. He argued that I should never be invited to Ukraine to deliver lectures on Stepan Bandera and the political and ethnic violence of the OUN and UPA. Slobod’ko used a similar pattern of argument in his sensational articles. His articles actually mobilised the Svoboda activists to participate in various radical right protests
and activities. Moreover, Slobod’ko republished a selective collection of commentaries from a debate that took place on the Facebook forum “Memory at War” and was accessible only to its members. Hrytsak did not comment on this unethical behaviour, but instead claimed that “one could hardly suspect [these two ‘younger Ukrainian historians’] of having sympathies toward Ukrainian nationalism.”

In the same response, Hrytsak also implied that I am a “bad historian who makes believe that (s)he is absolutely right.” When one compares this and Hrytsak’s other comments with Gogun’s comment on me as a “diligent PhD candidate,” or V’iatrovyč’s comment on Motyka and other Polish historians as “Polish pseudo-historians,” or his comment on Carynnky’s and Berkhoff’s publication as a “pseudoscientific article,” it becomes obvious that this kind of denigration is a tactic commonly used in post-Soviet radical right discourse in order to deal with criticism or “challenging” publications. For historians practising the obfuscation of the Holocaust it is easier to try to discredit a historian who uncovers the obfuscation or denial or explores some important aspects of the past, than it is to rethink and change their own attitude towards history. To understand this way of thinking it is important to keep in mind that Hrytsak believes I am not a historian but a “politruk,” i.e. a political commissar of the Soviet authorities. Hrytsak stated this in a commentary under his own article published on zakhid.net on 25 May 2012. In the same commentary he added that he will violate academic ethics and publish a review of my dissertation manuscript if the University of Pittsburgh Press allows him to behave in such an unethical way.

A few weeks after Ab Imperio published Hrytsak’s response to my review “Świat w mroku and Its Reception in Ukraine,” the internet journal Ukraïna Moderna, co-edited by Hrytsak, translated into Ukrainian and published Hrytsak’s response. Simultaneously Ukraïna Moderna did not translate my review. Thereby the readers of this journal have been informed how Hrytsak ignored the Lviv pogrom in his review of Chiger’s memoir, and how he rationalised it in his response, but the Ukrainian translation of the text that explains why and how he ignored these matters has been withheld from readers.

In 2005, Hrytsak was criticised by Sofia Grachova for a similar approach to history. Grachova criticised him for marginalising the pogroms, questioning information about their size, blaming the pogroms on Germans, Soviets and “indirectly on the very victims – Jews,” questioning the Jewish memoirs because of their “anti-Ukrainian character,” denying the antisemitic element of the OUN ideology, adopting the perspective of the OUN-B activist Iaroslav Stets’ko, believing in the stereotype of “Jewish-Communism,” having more sympathy for “traditional” than “politically active” Jews, and several other problematic matters that are embedded in Hrytsak’s publications.

In his response to Grachova, Hrytsak argued in a similar way to his response to my brief review essay “Świat w mroku and Its Reception in Ukraine,” claiming that he is not a nationalist but belongs to the group of historians who investigate nationalist approaches to history. Yet in the latter part of his article Hrytsak demonstrated that he does not agree with Grachova’s many essential points and actually belongs to the group criticised for their nationalist approaches. One important point on which he agreed with Grachova was her critique of his problematic approach to antisemitism, the Second World War and the Holocaust in his monograph Sketch of Ukrainian History (Narys Istoriї Ukraїny). This book was written in the early 1990s and published in 1995. In 2005, Hrytsak even argued that he is more critical about this publication than Grachova. Yet in his review of Chiger’s memoir from 2012 Hrytsak demonstrated a similar approach as in his monograph of 1995. Hrytsak finished his response to
Grachova in a similar manner to his response to my brief review essay, arguing that her publication was a “false start” and suggesting that she “makes another attempt.”

Comparing Hrytsak’s two reactions to articles critical of his interpretations of Ukrainian history, one can assess that Grachova was right in arguing that Hrytsak adopts Stets’ko’s perspective. However, one should differentiate between the early and late Stets’ko. The early Stets’ko claimed in 1941 that he “supports the destruction of the Jews and the expediency of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine.” The late Stets’ko denied after the war the Ukrainian contribution to the Holocaust. Hrytsak’s perspective has been similar to Stets’ko’s post-war argumentation but not his earlier one. It was also less extreme than Stets’ko’s after war argumentation but it resulted from a similar pattern of disavowing. In order to democratize and modernize Ukrainian society in the spirit of civil society scholars investigating Ukrainian history would need to open themselves to critical interpretations, to stop ignoring the “unpatriotic” aspects of history and to stop inventing more and more sophisticated rationalizations and justifications. A few historians have recently proved that it is possible to write in such a way. Ukaïna Moderna, the same internet journal, which published Hrytsak’s review and response, demonstrated that it is also possible to publish such articles. One can only hope that Hrytsak and a number of other historians will take the same path.

Denying the Pogroms and its Impact on Intellectuals

In 2011, Ruslan Zabilyi, the Director of the National Museum of the Victims of the Occupying Regimes “Tiurma na Liunts’ko” and a historian associated with the TsDVR, published a classical post-Soviet denial-oriented article about the act of 30 June 1941. He described Stets’ko’s proclamation of Ukrainian statehood in Lviv without mentioning even once the pogrom that occurred at the same time and place. He also failed to mention that the same organisation that proclaimed independence was involved in the pogrom and that its members were among the perpetrators.

Statehood was proclaimed on 30 June at about 8.00 p.m. in Rynok Square, Lviv’s central square. The pogrom began in the afternoon of the same day and lasted until the evening of 2 July. During the pogrom several hundred Jews were humiliated, beaten or killed by mainly the Ukrainian local population, OUN-B activists (mainly militiamen) and the Germans. The militiamen seized Jews in the streets or in their apartments and brought them to the prison yards, where they were forced to carry the decomposing bodies of the NKVD victims and where they were mistreated, beaten or killed by Ukrainians and Germans. The militiamen also delivered several hundred Jews to a sports field in Pelczyńska (Dmytra Vitovs’ko) Street. About 2500 to 3000 of the assembled Jews were shot by Einsatzkommando 5 and 6 of Einsatzgruppe C. Zabily did not mention any of this in his article on the “patriotic” activities of the OUN-B in Lviv between 30 June and Stets’ko’s arrest on 9 July, nor did he explain why he decided to omit it.

Zabilyi’s article, which appeared in the newspaper Historical Truth (Istorychna Pravda), edited by Solod’ko, is only one of hundreds of nationalist denial-oriented articles that have appeared almost daily since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This ritualised legitimation of denial by professional historians has had an enormous impact on society. For example, on 8 June 2011 the internet journal Maidan announced that “on 30 July [2011] at 11am exactly, a flash mob will read the Act of Renewal of the Ukrainian State simultaneously in seven places in Kyiv.” Like Zabilyi’s article the
announcement did not mention the involvement of the OUN-B in anti-Jewish violence or the antisemitic views of their leaders and only emphasised the nationalist virtues of the act and the arrest of Stets’ko and other OUN-B members. Consequently, on 30 July 2011 perhaps several dozen people celebrated the act of 30 June 1941 in seven symbolic places in Kiev, including Independence Square, Shevchenko University and Mohyla Academy.103

This approach to history naturally impacted also on intellectuals who argue that they are not nationalists and are sceptical towards nationalism. Two good examples are the writers Iurii Andrukhovych and Oksana Zabuzhko. In an article on Paweł Smoleński’s Burial of a Butcher (Pochówek dla rezuna), Andrukhovych argued that a solution to the problems regarding Bandera and the OUN and UPA should be a revision of negative stereotypes about them. According to this logic it is not the nationalism, enthusiasm for fascism and the war criminality of the OUN and UPA that should be regarded as a problem and debated. Instead the lack of tolerance for this movement, its achievements or the process of investigating the atrocities committed by the OUN and UPA should be regarded as untoward.104

Zabuzhko based her novel The Museum of Abandoned Secrets (Muzei pokynytykh sekretiv) on the Krentsbakh memoir published by the previously mentioned former head of the OUN propaganda apparatus, Mirchuk. The memoir is either a falsification or a document instrumentalised by radical right historians like Mirchuk and V’iatrovych. Logically, Zabuzhko’s novel depicts the UPA as an army that rescued Jews and did not commit any atrocities against them.105

David Duke as an “Expert” on the “Jewish Question” and the Park of Glory for Stepan Bandera

Also remarkable are the historians who, on the one hand, edit important and valuable collections of documents but, on the other, quote racists, antisemites, Holocaust deniers or preachers of hate as academic experts on antisemitism or related issues in their publications. For example, Ivan Patryliak, who edited important document collections on the OUN-B, cited the former Ku Klux Klan (KKK) Grand Wizard David Duke as an “expert” on the “Jewish Question” in the Soviet Union.106 Volodymyr Serhiichuk is another historian who edited many important documents on the UPA but in his publications rationalised, defended and denied the ethnic cleansing against the Polish population in Volhynia. He did this though the documents edited in his volumes confirm the atrocities undertaken by the OUN and UPA.107 The only reasonable explanation for this kind of academic conduct seems to be that for historians like Patryliak or Serhiichuk there is no connection between the information enclosed in the archival documents they edit and the history they write.

In addition to quoting the former KKK Grand Wizard David Duke as an “expert” on the “Jewish Question,” Patryliak did not make any secret of his admiration for Stepan Bandera. According to the TsDVR website, Patryliak believes that

His [Bandera’s] only strategic and essential position was directed toward the achievement of Ukrainian independence. Even after the underground in Ukraine was destroyed, Bandera remained a remarkable personality and the face of the Ukrainian nation because of which he was liquidated … Bandera fulfilled the mission of a national banner and as a symbol of the banner till now. It would be logical to erect for such outstanding personalities as Bandera a Park of Glory of national heroes with monuments and memorials.108
Conferences and Published Proceedings

In recent years a number of conferences on Ukrainian nationalism have been organised, and several academic volumes on the subject published. Here I introduce two of them in order to point out a few problems related to the process of editing volumes on the OUN and UPA. The first one is Strasti za Banderoiu (Bandera Passion) edited by Tarik Cyril Amar, Ihor Balynskyi and Iaroslav Hrytsak. The volume appeared in 2010. It contains a collection of 32 articles about Bandera that appeared during the Bandera debate in 2009 and 2010. The editors of the volume published several academic and critically written contributions, such as Amar’s essay on the Bandera monument in the city of Lviv which finishes with an appeal to dismantle Soviet monuments in the whole of Ukrainian space and not to erect a Bandera monument in Lviv.109 Yet together with these articles and essays the editors also reproduced a number of non-academic and problematic articles without commenting on them. Amar, Balynskyi and Hrytsak argue in the introduction, “The editors of this volume did not anticipate evaluating the different thesis or attitudes toward Bandera.”110

Authors of these problematic articles include V’iatrovykh, Aleksandrov, Stephen Bandera, Marko Levytskyi, Askold Lozynskyi and Moisei Fishbein. They explicitly deny the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN and UPA (Lozynskyi and Fishbein), or argue that Bandera was not a terrorist and radical nationalist (V’iatrovykh) or claim that they cannot criticise Bandera because of the existence of Soviet stereotypes (Aleksandrov). They thereby ignore the sources that confirm the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN–UPA or Bandera’s involvement in the organisation of terrorist acts in the 1930s. By not providing these texts with any critical introduction or commentary, the editors imply that they are as valuable and true as all the other texts in the volume. Consequently the volume suggests that the reader can either believe V’iatrovykh’s text, which denies the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN, or texts written according to the standards of history as an academic discipline that confirm and explain the pogroms.111

Franziska Bruder commented on the dubious conduct of the editors of this volume:

Public and historical debates are not conducted in a vacuum. Of course, there will be diverging positions, varying foci, different emphases on sources – but historical researchers follow recognised standards in dealing with sources, which no historian can ignore without tarnishing his or her reputation. In addition, when evaluating sources and historical situations, historians must adhere to certain values, as they are, for instance, held by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

Society as a whole, its journalists and scientists, need to take these values into account when evaluating historical events. Otherwise, they open the door to positions and practices that violate human rights. The rise of the populist right in Europe, including openly fascist movements, forbids us to look too optimistically into the future. Every time there is a historical–political debate, what needs to be made transparent to participants and the public are the scientific standards – and value systems – a discussant adheres to. (To put it more bluntly: A forger of documents or a self-declared racist should not be considered a potential discussant.) Clearly, a historical anthology needs to follow these principles as well. And yet, in the volume at hand, individuals are given a voice whose arguments are based on the negation and twisting of historical facts.112

Another important but no less problematic volume, Historical and Political Truth in Scientific Research, appeared in 2012 after a conference in 2009 at the University of...
The volume contains several good and excellent articles written by Karel Berkhoff, John-Paul Himka, Ihor Iliushyn, Lucyna Kulińska, Per Anders Rudling and Ewa Siemaszko, as well as several important survivor memoirs and a number of other documents. The volume is devoted to the ethnic cleansing conducted by the OUN and UPA in 1943 in Volhynia and in 1944 in eastern Galicia, a subject that, as the volume’s editor Bogusław Paź correctly argues, has been very much denied and diminished since 1991 by diverse Ukrainian nationalist organisations and, between 2005 and 2010 also by President Iushchenko.113

The problematic features of this volume are related to the editor and to the agency of its contributors. Besides being a professor of philosophy at the University of Wrocław, Bogusław Paź is also a leading political activist of the community of *kresowiacy* (expelled inhabitants of the former Polish eastern territories). The *kresowiacy* community unites many survivors of the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia and eastern Galicia. Historians and activists related to this community have collected many significant documents on the ethnic cleansing, mainly survivor testimonies. Yet the community has also developed a problematic narrative of the ethnic cleansing and Polish–Ukrainian relations. They have embedded ethnic cleansing, Polish–Ukrainian relations and the Polish–Ukrainian conflict during and after the Second World War in the nationalist narrative of Polish martyrology, which overemphasises crimes committed against Poles and de-emphasises crimes committed by Poles against others. Moreover, this approach to history negates and justifies the Polish politics in the Second Republic (1918–39), under which Ukrainians and other non-Polish minorities were essentially treated as second-class citizens. It also denies the anti-Ukrainian violence and war crimes committed during the Second World War by Polish underground forces, like the AK, the NSZ, or the Peasants’ Battalions (Bataliony Chłopskie, BCh).114

The instrumentalisation of the suffering of the Polish victims of the ethnic cleansing in Volhynia and eastern Galicia is another important feature of the activism of the community of *kresowiacy*. For example, the radical right journal *National Stands* (*Postawy Narodowe*) published a letter to the Polish Secretary of Education, Katarzyna Hall, signed by such prominent members of the *kresowiacy* community as Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, Czesław Partacz, Bogumił Grott, Lucyna Kulińska and Bogusław Paź. The authors demanded the inclusion of several nationalist publications on the ethnic cleansing in 1943–4 in the school curriculum and the exclusion of publications written by professional historians like Grzegorz Motyka. To strengthen the message, a photograph of a young woman, described as a UPA victim, shown hacked into four pieces on a table was published above the letter. In addition to Paź the letter was signed by three other contributors to the volume, including Tadeusz Isakowicz-Zaleski, Czesław Partacz and Lucyna Kulińska.115

Paź’s nationalist activism went even beyond engaging in the community of *kresowiacy*. In 2011 he signed a list supporting the Independence March (Marsz Niepodległości) organised in Poland every year on 11 November, National Independence Day, which commemorates the anniversary of the establishment of a Polish state in 1918.116 The signatures for the march were collected by the Association of the Soldiers of the National Armed Forces (Związek Żołnierzy Narodowych Sił Zbrojnych, ZZBSZ). The NSZ were a Polish radical right military underground organisation that during the Second World War murdered dozens or hundreds of Jews and Ukrainians.117 In recent years, the Independence March has attracted various radical right and neo-fascist groups that base their ideology on ultranationalism, racism, fascism, antisemitism, xenophobia and militarism. In 2011 in Wrocław one of these groups, the party
National Rebirth of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski, NOP) celebrated its thirtieth anniversary on the day of the Independence March and the following day. For this occasion it invited such radical right activists as the leader of the Italian neo-fascist party New Force (Forza Nuova, FN), Roberto Fiore, and the former head of the Ku Klux Klan, David Duke.\footnote{118}

The relevant question for \textit{Historical and Political Truth in Scientific Research}, however, is only how Paź’s nationalist and radical right convictions and activism influenced the academic nature of the volume and the articles of its contributors. Paź’s foreword to the volume contains several problematic statements. The editor claims for example that the OUN, UPA and the Waffen-SS Galizien were composed of Nazis (\textit{naziści}), which is not credible because with the exception of a few German officers in the Waffen-SS Galizien there were no members of the German National Socialist Party in this division or in the OUN and UPA.\footnote{119}

A similar problem appears with the term and concept of “genocide.” The volume introduces three texts of Prosecutors of the Institute of National Remembrance (Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, IPN). They very clearly explain what the term means in criminal law and how it is used to prosecute criminals who violate it. Yet the editor has based the concept of the entire historical volume on it. The term appears in the subtitle and the editor explains that the ethnic cleansing was genocide. This, unlike the legal meaning of the term, is problematic, since the term “genocide” is misused by political activists who use it to emphasise the uniqueness of a particular atrocity. This leads us to another related major problem of the volume, the non-contextualisation of the anti-Polish violence in eastern Galicia and Volhynia and the marginalisation of anti-Ukrainian violence committed by Poles.

The volume impressively and convincingly explains the ethnic cleansing in eastern Galicia and Volhynia, legal aspects of the crimes, the collective denial of the crime, the violent and antisemitic attitude of the OUN and UPA to the Jews, the fate in 1942 of the Ukrainian Hauptmann of the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, Roman Shukhevych, and several other crucial matters concerning the Ukrainian nationalist movement. But it does not name any reasons for this violence that lie outside the ideology of the OUN. It does not ask how the politics in the Second Republic, the aftermath of the order of the Treaty of Versailles which left Ukrainians without a state, or the politics of the Polish government-in-exile that insisted on including the contested territories in the Polish state contributed to the ethnic cleansing during the Second World War.\footnote{120} This does not mean that any of these reasons explain or even were a major motive for the outburst of ethnic cleansing. It also does not justify the ethnic cleansing nor does it rehabilitate its perpetrators. But these reasons certainly did matter and they are completely marginalised in the volume. Similarly marginalised is the anti-Ukrainian violence performed by various Polish units like the AK, NSZ or BCh in the territories of south-eastern Poland during 1939 and 1945.

A further substantial problem of the volume is the overstating of the number of the victims of ethnic cleansing by its editor. Although it is not known exactly how many people were murdered during the period of ethnic cleansing, scholars investigating this problematic issue assume that the number lies somewhere between 70,000 and 100,000. Yet Paź claims that “200,000 Poles, women, seniors and children, who in a barbaric manner were annihilated by Ukrainian Nazis from the SS ‘Galizien,’ and OUN–UPA.” This number has no relation to the empirical research and originates from the writings of such Communists turned radical right historians as Edward Prus, who even claimed a half million victims of ethnic cleansing.\footnote{121}
As already mentioned, the volume contains several valuable academic articles, which are not under discussion here, but the agency of its contributors should be an object of debate. Although articles written by Berkhoff, Himka, Iliushyn and Rudling either do not touch upon or do not support Paz’s claims about the inflated number of victims or other problematic assumptions, the question should be put as to whether it is right to agree to the publishing of texts in a volume edited by a person with ultranationalist convictions who deliberately instrumentalises history.

Contextualisation of Violence in Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands

Bloodlands. Europe Between Hitler and Stalin by Timothy Snyder has certainly been one of the bestselling and most debated historical books of the twenty-first century. Snyder’s monograph was welcomed, admired and praised by many reviewers. It was also criticised by scholars, in particular specialists of East Central European or Holocaust history such as Omer Bartov, Dan Diner, Dovid Katz, Alexander J. Groth, Thomas Kühne, the author of this article, Per Anders Rudling, Stefan Troebst, Jürgen Zarusky and Efraim Zuroff. In reaction to some of these reviews, Snyder argued that the “opposition to the book has, in general, come from ethnic nationalists of all varieties, a kind of nationalist international.”

In his monograph, Snyder raised many important issues while comparing diverse forms of political and ethnic violence in the 1930s and 1940s in the space between Berlin and Moscow, which he has called the “bloodlands.” His approach to ethnic and political violence in this part of Europe was not entirely new, but it was engaging. In this article I would like to discuss only one aspect of Snyder’s Bloodlands: the killing of civilians by the AK, LAF, OUN, NSZ, UPA and Polish collaboration with the Germans. It appears to me to be one of the most problematic features of Snyder’s comparative study, which as a widely read book has had a substantial impact on a large number of people and their understanding of the Holocaust in the bloodlands.

One could argue that the killing of civilians by the AK, LAF, OUN, NSZ and UPA is not a major issue of the history of ethnic and political violence taking place in the bloodlands because those movements killed far fewer people than the German and Soviet armies or authorities. However, in terms of human rights, the ideologies and killing methods of those movements did not essentially differ from German and Soviet ones. Therefore, the relevant question is how historians, who have embedded those movements in a larger narrative of mass destruction, as Snyder did in Bloodlands and Alexander V. Prusin in The Lands Between: Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870–1992, should deal with them. Should they ignore or diminish the violent and anti-democratic nature of those movements and mention them only at a peripheral level or should they take them as seriously as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union? Frequently, those movements came into being in small societies like western Ukraine or Lithuania, whose populations was not much bigger than the population of a single German or Soviet city. Thus, their impact on the local population was in many respects comparatively as disastrous as the impact of German fascism or Soviet totalitarianism. Snyder, however, leans towards the first option; he marginalises them rather than discusses them comprehensively and does not directly address the question of Polish collaboration with the Germans at all.

Briefly introducing the pogroms in 1941 in western Ukraine, Snyder mentions that the local populations took part in them, that they were organised by Einsatzgruppe C and the local militia. But he does not point out that the local militia was established...
by the OUN-B. He also does not point out to what extent the OUN was involved in the anti-Jewish violence in July 1941 and does not discuss their plans to become a part of a fascist Europe under the aegis of Nazi Germany. Writing about the pogroms in Lithuania, Snyder does not even mention the LAF and writes only about Lithuanian nationalists. Given the fact that he provides detailed and pictorial descriptions of the murders of Ukrainians or Poles committed by the Soviets, it is hard not to agree with Dovid Katz, who commented on this approach to dealing with ethnic and political violence:

As a student of state mass murder, Snyder rightly imparts the vile horror of these mass killing policies. Speaking of the Ukrainian famine in 1933, he records that “countless parents killed and ate their children and then died of starvation later anyway. One mother cooked her son for herself and her daughter. One six-year-old girl, saved by other relatives, last saw her father when he was sharpening a knife to slaughter her.” Speaking of transports from Warsaw to Treblinka in 1942, he recounts that “children licked each other’s sweat.” Describing the gas chambers in Treblinka, he explains that “the bodies were twisted together, limb through limb” and “covered, as was the chamber itself, with blood, faeces, and urine.”

But there is no mention of the head of Rabbi Zalmen Osovsky (Zalman Osowski) of Slabodka (now the Vilijampolė suburb of Kaunas), which was cut off and put in a shop window by Lithuanian “partisans” before the Nazis arrived; or of the girl cut in two, the halves left for show on a central street of Shavl (Šiauliai) before the Nazis arrived; or of the Lietukis Garage in Kaunas, where dozens of Jews were killed at a gas station by beating and the forced pumping of pressured hoses through various body orifices until they exploded, on 27 June 1941, when the Germans had arrived in town but were still acting as observers. As Konrad Kwiet put it, “In Kaunas (Kovno), the diabolic fervour of the antisemitic crowds rivalled anything known about the possibilities for human cruelty.”

In writing about the ethnic and political violence in a time frame of almost two decades and a space between Berlin and Moscow, Snyder cannot deliver a detailed description of every kind of terror that took place there. Obviously he is free in a comparative study to pay more attention to some events than others, but he is obliged to explain why he chose such a method. There are even good reasons for such kinds of unequal representation of ethnic and political violence in the bloodlands, such as making the West more aware of the Soviet terror or the Soviet famine. Yet, Snyder does not explain why he pays more attention and delivers more moving and emotional descriptions to some forms of ethnic and political terror, like the famine in 1933–4, or the killing of Polish war prisoners by Soviets in Katyn, than to the pogroms in 1941 or the liquidation of Soviet prisoners by the Germans. He thereby spins webs of significance that are problematic and leaves the impression of judging different forms of ethnic and political violence by different values and thus being more or less respectful to victims depending on the political nature of the terror that killed them.

Similarly problematic is Snyder’s attitude towards Poles. The author elaborates on every possible kind of Soviet and Nazi terror that killed Poles, like the Polish operation during the Great Terror, the murdering of Polish soldiers in Katyn or the killing of Polish civilians by Germans and the OUN–UPA. He also delivers quite detailed descriptions of Poles rescuing Jews or informing the West about the annihilation of the Jews. Yet in contrast to this Snyder has little to say about how Poles murdered Jews during the Second World War, or how they collaborated with the Germans. Alexander J. Groth correctly pointed out that Snyder introduces the Polish antisemitic and radical right politician Roman Dmowski only in the context.
of the conferences in Paris and the Treaty of Versailles which established Poland as a state after the First World War, but does not introduce Dmowski’s antisemitic writings and their impact on the Polish population. Nor does he explain how they impacted on Polish–Jewish relations in Poland or motivated Poles to kill Jews during the Second World War.129

Regarding the AK and the Jews, Snyder explains how it tried to inform the West about the annihilation of Jews and that there were people “of Jewish origins” in the Home Army but does not discuss how antisemitic parts of the AK actually were or how or why they killed Jews. He does not ignore the issue of antisemitism in the AK in general but fails to take a clear position on the antisemitic elements of the AK.130 This approach becomes particularly evident when we examine what Snyder writes about the NSZ, whose members claimed to be even more “patriotic” and were more eager to murder Jews or Ukrainians than the AK. Snyder writes that Jews joined or founded the antisemitic NSZ and does not mention that the NSZ killed Jews and other civilians.131

Conclusion

The dissolution of the Soviet Union triggered a complete reinterpretation of Eastern European nationalist and ultranationalist movements that were named and shamed in Soviet propaganda while its members were labelled as traitors. After the disappearance of Soviet propaganda these movements became a part of the national identity of the new post-Soviet states. In radical contradiction of their former “demonisation” they were whitewashed of any sins and presented as heroic and patriotic armies or organisations. Monuments were erected to such nationalists as Bandera and Dmowski. The veterans of those movements who left their countries together with the Germans in 1944 substantially contributed to the heroisation of those movements and thereby themselves as well. Ukrainian émigrés succeeded in engaging young scholars like Himka to distribute leaflets in Ukraine and also used other methods to familiarise local intellectuals with their denial-oriented narrative of the Second World War and the Holocaust. Because this narrative was also “anti-Soviet” it was in agreement with the anti-Soviet Cold War politics of Western states. Some of the former ultranationalist activists who during the Cold War obfuscated the Holocaust were sponsored by Western intelligence services.

The opening of the archives after the dissolution of the Soviet Union made it possible to study the involvement of the AK, LAF, NSZ, OUN, ROA, UPA and other movements in the Holocaust and other atrocities committed by them during and after the Second World War. Some of these atrocities were known and appeared in academic publications during the Cold War, but they were marginalised and the scholars who published about them were declared anti-Lithuanian, anti-Polish, anti-Ukrainian, etc., or they were described as being guilty of distributing Soviet propaganda.

A similar practice of labelling scholars who investigate the atrocities of the nationalist and ultranationalist movements or the reception of these atrocities was applied by historians after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Scholars who criticised radical right historians for equating Nazi Germany with the Soviet Union or denying the involvement of Ukrainians in the Holocaust were labelled as “political commissars of the Soviet Union,” “propagandists,” “Jews,” “communists,” etc. After being exposed for some problematic descriptions of the Holocaust, some historians, like Gogun, did not acknowledge and rethink their problematic approach to this subject, but rather
decided to claim that they did not do anything wrong in their previous publications and that the person criticising them must be incompetent.

Other scholars like Hrytsak rethought their attitude to the Holocaust on a theoretical level. They began arguing that Ukrainians must acknowledge their role in the Holocaust or in a more economic and political way, that “Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry ticket.” On a practical level, however, they did not change their way of writing about the Holocaust and presented problematic and very problematic approaches over and over again. Like the first group they did not stop arguing that they were victims of “arbitrary reading” or that scholars who analyse their publications must be incompetent.

Himka and Marples, on the other hand, clearly reconsidered their approach to the OUN and the Holocaust in Ukraine. In the 1990s they began publishing critical and very important works. In contrast to Himka and Marples scholars like Hunczak and Kosyk did not stop denying and obfuscating after 1991. Their reaction to Berkhoff and Carynnyk’s article about Stets’ko’s autobiography from 1941 is one of many examples.

It is also important to note that historians specialising in arguments of denial set up their own institutes with the help of members and veterans of the former ultranationalist organisations, parties and armies. A very good example is the TsDVR located in the building of the Academy of Sciences in Lviv. V’iatrovych, the director of the institute, is perhaps the most prominent Holocaust obfuscator in the post-Soviet space although one should not underestimate the obfuscating efficiency of historians like Gogun. Both V’iatrovych and Gogun were fellows at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, which indicates that Ukrainian institutes at leading universities founded during the Cold War by the Ukrainian diaspora including OUN, UPA and Waffen-SS Galizien veterans have supported nationalist history writing and tolerated the obfuscation of the Holocaust or the denial of Ukrainian antisemitism.

Whitewashing the history of nationalist and ultranationalist movements has also been connected to such nationalist activities as the erecting of monuments to nationalist and antisemitic politicians like Roman Dmowski in Warsaw, or such war criminals as Dmytro Kliachkivskyi in Rivne (in western Ukraine). The legitimising of nationalism in historical publications and erecting of monuments to nationalist politicians or war criminals are two parts of a reciprocal process with disastrous consequences for the local population. We can look into this process when opening, for example, Gogun’s monograph *Between Hitler and Stalin. The Ukrainian Insurgents*, where one finds pictures of monuments of Roman Shukhevych or foundation stones for monuments of Stepan Bandera without any critical comments on these monuments.

Historians like Amar or Snyder, who are not uncritical on nationalism and the post-Soviet rehabilitation of nationalism – a completely different phenomenon to V’iatrovych, Gogun, Hunczak, Kosyk or Paż and not to be equated with them – also exhibit some problematic approaches to the radical right discourses analysed in this article. Amar wrote a critical and interesting essay on Stepan Bandera and Lviv and published a few other valuable articles about Soviet politics in western Ukraine and public memory in post-Soviet Lviv, but he also republished together with Balynskyi, Aleksandov, Stephen Bandera, Levyts’kyi, Lozynskyi and Fishbein in an academic volume without commenting on them. He thereby provided these texts with academic legitimacy as Bruder clearly and correctly elaborated in her review. In his comparative monograph on the Soviet and Nazi terror Snyder downplayed the terror of the Eastern European nationalist movements and also
collaboration with Germans. Poles in Bloodlands mainly appear as victims of other regimes and only very marginally as perpetrators. This narrative is in total agreement with how Polish “patriots” imagine the history of the Second World War, but it is in contradiction to what history as an academic discipline has to say about the Poles, the Holocaust and the Second World War.

Although post-Soviet radical right discourses still have a significant impact on historical debates, memory and the perception of history in many East Central European countries, one should not forget that there has been a process of exploring and rethinking difficult historical matters such as the various contributions to the Holocaust, collaboration with Nazi Germany or fascistisation of the various national movements. In 2001, after the publication of Jan Tomasz Gross’s Neighbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland, the Polish involvement in the Holocaust was openly debated in Poland and a number of other significant publications devoted to this subject appeared, although not all historians paid attention to them. In the context of a different political situation, the ongoing search for national identity, the lack of separation between academia and politics, the enormous cultural and political hostility between the western and eastern parts of the country and political parties, the same process in Ukraine has remained much more demanding. On the one hand, scholars in Ukraine express the wish to come to terms with their own history but, on the other, they repeatedly equate the German and Soviet occupation, compare their suffering to Jewish suffering, eulogise war criminals and ultranationalists, imitate the argumentation of radical right parties if they lack rational arguments, produce problematic publications or claim that scholars who investigate the obfuscation of the Holocaust and discipline Holocaust discourse are propagandists or political commissars of the Soviet authorities.

Notes on the Author

Notes
1. On Holocaust denial, see Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust; Shermer and Grobman, Denying History.
4. For the founding of the OUN, see Carynnyk, “Foes of Our Rebirth,” 315–16. For the UVO and the OUN, see Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen”, 63–6; Motyka, Ukrainiska partyzantka, 42–4. For UNDO, see Goleczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 1010–11. For the UNDO and other legal political parties in the Second Republic, see Szumiło, Ukrainska Reprezentacja Parlamentarna w Sejmie i Senacie.
8. For the Ukrainian National Revolution, see Rossoliński-Liebe, “‘Ukrainian National Revolution’,” 83–114. For feeling to be related to the Hlinka Party and the Ustaša, and their influence, see Pan’kivs’kyi, Roky nimets’koï okupatsii, 178; Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust,” 7.


12. For the Lviv pogrom, see Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941,” 209–43. For the numbers of victims, see Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944, 61; Yones, Smoke in the Sand, 81. Christoph Mick estimated 7000 victims of the Lviv pogrom: Mick, Kriegserfahrungen in einer multiethnischen Stadt: Lemberg 1914–1947, 473. Dieter Pohl estimated that in all the pogroms in western Ukraine between 13,000 and 35,000 Jews were killed: Pohl, “Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine,” 306.


15. For the Waffen-SS Galizien, see Margolian, Unauthorized Entry, 131–2, 135, 146. For Ukrainians in the Displaced Persons (DP) camps, see Lalande, “Building a Home Abroad,” 39–94.

16. For the second Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, the brutal conflict between the Soviets and the OUN–UPA, and the terror conducted by the Soviets and the OUN–UPA against the civil population, see Burds, “AGENTURA,” 104–15; Bruder, “Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen”, 231–2, 261–2; Motyka, Ukraińska partyzantka, 503–74, 649–50; Boekh, Stalinismus in der Ukraine, 339–67.


20. Lebed’, UPA.

21. For Mirchuk as the head of the OUN propaganda apparatus, see Golczewski, Deutsche und Ukrainer, 942. Some of Mirchuk’s most popular publications are: Koly horyat’ lisy; Akt vidnovelnia Ukraїns’koї Derzhavnosti 30 chervnia 1941 roku; Ukraїns’ka Povstants’ka Armia 1942–1952; Za chystotu pozytii ukrains’koho vyzvolnoho rukhu; Stepan Bandera; In the German Mills of Death, 1941–1945; Ukraїns’ka derzhavnist’, 1917–1920; Narys istorii OUN; Revolutiistyi zmah za USSR.

22. Mirchuk, My Meetings and Discussions in Israel, 25–6. For the instrumentalisation of the detention in the Auschwitz camp by another OUN-B member, see Petelycky, Into Auschwitz, for Ukraine. For OUN-B prisoners in Auschwitz, see Bruder, “’Der Gerechtigkeit dienen,’” 138–54; Cyra, “Banderowcy w KL Auschwitz,” 388–402.

23. Wolodymyr Kosyk published several monographs and a vast number of articles. The very selective edition of documents L’Allemagne national-socialiste et l’Ukraine was translated into German, English and Ukrainian. On Kosyk as a professor of the UFU, see Shafoval, Universitas Libera Ukrainensis, 128.
24. Hryno’kh was an OUN member and chaplain of the Nachtigall and Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201. He worked at the UFU from 1974 to 1994. See, Shafoval, *Universitas Libera Ucrainensis*, 122.

25. After the Second World War, Stets’ko produced a vast amount of ideological works. The most important is perhaps *30 chervnia 1941*.

26. Mykola Klymysyn published two volumes of historical memoirs: *V pokhodi do voli*.

27. Stepan Lenkav’skiy published a joint hagiography of Symon Petliura, Ievhen Konovalets’ and Stepan Bandera: *Petliura, Konowalez, Bandera von Moskau ermordet*. During a meeting of Stets’ko’s government in July 1941, Lenkav’skiy claimed, “regarding the Jews we will adopt any methods that lead to their destruction”: copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Ukrainian State Administration, TsDAVOV f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 9, 1–4.

28. Bandera mainly published articles in newspapers. After his death the articles were republished in Bandera, *Perspektivy ukrains’koї revoliutsiї*.


30. Ilnytskyi published two volumes on Germany and Ukraine during the Second World War: *Deutschland und die Ukraine 1934–1945*.

31. On Taras Hunczak and his brother, sister and father being in the OUN, see Hunczak, *Moi spohady*, 16, 22, 30. Rudling wrote in “Theory and Practice” that Hunczak was an OUN member. Hunczak denied this fact and demanded that Rudling correct this statement. Rudling published an erratum in which he stated that Hunczak had never been a member of the OUN. However, in his own memoir published in 2005 Hunczak states that he had belonged to the OUN. See Rudling, “Erratum,” *East European Jewish Affairs* 37, no. 1 (2007), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501670701307404 (accessed 8 May 2012); Hunczak, *Moi spohady*, 30.

32. Potichnyj came in 1947 in a UPA unit from Ukraine to Munich; see Potichnyj, *V pokhodi do voli*.

33. For Veryha in the Waffen-SS Galizien, see Veryha, *Pid krylamyvy zvol’nykh dum*. Veryha’s works were published by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Canada. Cf. Veryha, *The Correspondence of the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow and Lviv with the German authorities, 1939–1944*; Veryha, *Dorohamy druhoi svitovoi viini*.

34. On Horbatsch in the Waffen-SS Galizien, see Melnyk, *To Battle*, 335–6.


37. Compare OUN v svitli postanov Velykikh Zboriv, 44–5, with the original publication of 1941, “Postanovyi II. Velykooho Zboru Orhanizatsii Ukrains‘kikh kykh Natsionalistiv,” TsDAHO (Tsentr‘nji derzhavnii arxiv hromads‘kykh obiednan‘ Ukrainy [Central State Archives of Public Organisations of Ukraine]), f. 1, op. 23, spr. 926, 199.

38. For the original text, see “Akt proholoshennia ukrains’koi derzhavy, 30.06.1941,” TsDAVOV f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 5, 3. For the falsified reprint of the text, see for example “Text of Sovereignty Proclamation,” *Ukrainian Echo*, 25 June 1980, 3.


40. Marples, “Ukraine during World War II,” 7, 13. After publishing my article “Celebrating Fascism,” in which I analysed David Marples’ article from 1985, Marples informed me that privately he does not “recall having strong feelings about UPA one way or another at that time [of writing the article],” and that he wrote the article for Radio Liberty, where he worked as a research analyst on Ukraine. He advised me to “keep in mind [that] there was practically nothing available at that time in terms of archival material.”

(accessed 22 January 2012). In the 1980s Himka specialised in the nineteenth century. He published books and articles on socialism in Galicia and the Greek Catholic Church. The OUN and UPA were not the main subject of his investigation.

42. For Prolog, see Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust,” 19; Kuzio, “U.S. Support for Ukraine’s Liberation during the Cold War,” 1–14.

43. Honcharuk, Z istorii kolektyvizatsiî sil’s koho hospodarstva zakhidnykh oblastei Ukrain’skoi RSR. This publication can be found in several libraries in Ukraine and other countries. From OUN member Andrii Kutsan I know that the publication was printed in the ZCh OUN’s publishing house Cicero at Zeppelinstraße 67 in Munich. Interview with Andrii Kutsan, 14 February 2008, Munich.

44. Lypovets’kyi, Orhanizatsiia, 84.


46. The majority of V’iatrovych’s publications were not peer reviewed and were published by the TsDVR or other OUN-related nationalist publishers. See, V’iatrovych, Reidy UPA terenamy Chehoslovachchyny; V’iatrovych, Armiiia bezsmertnykh; V’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN; V’iatrovych, Ukrains’ka Pavovts’ka Armiiia; V’iatrovych, Druha pol’s’ko-ukraïns’ka viïna.

47. “Ihor Yukhnov’s’kyi, Academician, head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory,” in V’iatrovych, Ukrains’ka Pavovts’ka Armiiia, back cover. The translation of the endorsement is from Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust,” 28.


49. The article was Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 149–84; V’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN, 9. Later he introduced Motyka’s book but dismissed it in a similar fashion; ibid., 76.

50. V’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN, 11, 43.

51. Ibid., 16–17, 62.

52. Ibid., 59–61.

53. Ibid., 69, 71.

54. For the order, see Weiner, Making Sense of War, 264; Statiev, The Soviet Counter Insurgency in Western Borderlands, 85.


56. V’iatrovych, Stavlennia OUN, 76–80. Autobiographies of well-known OUN members, TsDAVOV f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 57, 17; Bruder, “Den Ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen”, 150. This soldier was Viktor Khar’kiv “Khmara;” see Patryliak, Viskova diaïl’ história OUN(b) u 1940–1942 rokakh, 361–2. For killing Jews by the UPA, see Motyka, Ukrains’ka partyzantka, 290–5; Rossoliński-Liebe, “Academic Article;” Himka, “The Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Holocaust.”


58. See for example Gogun, Stalinische kommandos.


60. The authors do not to specify when exactly in 1942, at which conference, under which circumstances and for which reasons the OUN-B passed that resolution; cf. Gogun and Vovk, “Evrei v bor’be za nezavisimuiu Ukrainu.”


62. Gogun, Mezhdu Hitlerom i Stalinnym; Gogun, Staliniske kommandos.

63. Gogun and Vovk, “Evrei v bor’be za nezavisimuiu Ukrainu.” The publication on the Jewish physicians, see Yones, Die Straße nach Lemberg, 111–12.

64. Cf. Gogun and Vovk, “Evrei v bor’be za nezavisimuiu Ukrainu.”

65. Ibid.

among the ROA officers] also representatives of other nationalities: Poles, Greeks, Croats. And what surprised the author of this paper – Jews. Three men of 120.”


69. Gogun, Mezdu Gitlerom i Stanym, plates between pages 192 and 193.


73. Freidman, Zaglata żydów lwowskich; Freidman, “Ukrainian–Jewish Relations during the Nazi Occupation,” 259–96. For example the memoirs of Stefan Szende appeared as early as 1945: Szende, Der letzte Jude aus Polen. On the shaping of the radical right discourse by the Ukrainian political émigrés, see Rudling, “The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust.”


81. Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.”

82. “Mii zhyttiepyts,” TsDAVOV f. 3833, op. 3, spr. 7, 6. See also Berkhoff and Carynnyk, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” 162.


about the Jews in the UPA camps, but omits that Friedman also pointed out that those Jews were murdered by the OUN and UPA: Hunczak, “Commentary,” 136.

85. For Jaroslav Hrytsak’s review of Roman Kamienicki and Niccolò Guarnaschelli, Ukraine Moderna, see Hrytsak, “Korotko pro knyzhku Ignatia Khigera ‘Svit u Morotsi’.” For my review, see Rossolinii-Liebe, “Świat w mroku and Its Reception in Ukraine.” For Hrytsak’s response, see Hrytsak, “My Response.”


87. Hrytsak, “My Response,” 451, 453. This argumentation becomes even more mystifying if we consider that Hrytsak reprinted in the volume Strasti za Banderoiu (Bandera passion), which appeared in 2010, articles that explicitly deny the anti-Jewish violence of the OUN and UPA without commenting them. On Strasti za Banderoiu see the discussion below.


89. Ibid., 452.


93. Hrytsak was asked by the organisers of the conference “Recovering Forgotten History. The Image of East-Central Europe in Anglo-Saxon Textbooks” to review the manuscript. For Hrytsak’s comment on 27 May 2012 under his article, see Hrytsak, “Kolisnychenko znovu,” Hrytsak made this comment after Vadym Kolisnychenko, a politician of the populist Ukrainian Party of Regions, translated my, Per Anders Rudling’s and Timothy Snyder’s articles and published them in a volume without our permission. See, “Public Statement Concerning Instrumentalization of Academic

94. After I submitted my review the editors of Ab Imperio contacted Iaroslav Hrytsak, informed him that I had written a review of Świat w mroku and its reception in Ukraine, sent the manuscript of my unpublished review to Hrytsak and published his response in the same issue. Similarly they contacted V’iatrovych, whose last publication Druha Ukraïns’ko-Poľ’ska Vinya was reviewed by Ihor Iliushyn, Grzegorz Motyka, Per Anders Rudling and Andrzej Ziemba, and asked him to write a response.


98. Ibid., 27.

99. Ibid., 28.

100. See for example Vynnyk, Dytiachi holosy. Svidchennia tykh, khto perezhivy Holokaust u Lvovi, 7 August 2012; Zaitsev, “Ukraїns’kyi nacionalizm ta italiis’kyi fashyzm (1922–1939).”


102. For the sports field, see AŻH (Archiwum Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego [Archives of the Jewish Historical Museum in Warsaw]), 302/26, Lejb Wieliczker, 8; Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung, 68–9; Heer, “Einigung in den Holocaust,” 424–4. For the pogroms, see Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom of 1941.” For Stets’ko’s arrest, see “Komunitat,” TsDAVOV f. 3833, op. 1, spr. 6, 2.


104. Andruhowycz, “Andruhowycz o Smoleńskim”.


109. Taric Cyril Amar published also other interesting and critical articles on Lviv. See for example Amar, “Different but the Same or the Same but Different?” 373–96.


111. Ibid., 50–64, 75–89, 140–2, 143–4, 199–210, 222–36.

112. Bruder, “Strasti za Banderoju (‘Bandera Passion’),”.

113. Paź, Prawda historyczna a prawda polityczna w badaniach.


116. For Bogusław Paź on the list supporting the march, see http://marszniepodleglosci.pl/komitet-poparcia/ (accessed 30 January 2012).

117. For the murder of Jews by the NSZ, see Gutman, Enzyklopädie des Holocausts, vol. 2, 986, 1101, 1128; Grabowski, Judenjagd, 118–19; Engelking, Żest taki piękný słoneczny dzień, 238–9; Cichy, “Polen und Juden,” 54–78. For the murder of Ukrainians by NSZ,
see Motyka, “Polska reakcja na działania UPA – skala i przebieg akcji odwetowych,” 85.


121. See Paź, “Omission as a Radical Form of Historical Lie,” 138. For Edward Prus, see Rossoliński-Liebe, “Der polnisch–ukrainische Historikerdiskurs,” 55. For the number of 70,000–100,000 victims, see Motyka, Ukraińska partyzantka, 410–12. Another contributor to the volume, Czesław Partacz, claims 134,000–200,000 Polish victims: Partacz, “Przemyczanie w ukraińskiej historiografii przyczyny ludobójstwa popełnionego przez OUN–UPA na ludności polskiej,” 148. Berkhoff distanced himself from these numbers and wrote in his article that as a result of the Volhynia massacre 15,000 or more Poles were killed: Berkhoff, “Akcja wyniszczania Polaków,” 80.


123. Snyder, “The Form,” 156, n. 11.


131. Cf. Snyder, Bloodlands, 302. For antisemitism in the AK and the murder of Jews by the AK and NSZ, see Gutman, Enzyklopädie des Holocausts, vol. 2, 986, 1101, 1128; Grabowski, Judenjagd, 118–19; Engelking, Jest taki piękny słoneczny dzień, 238–9;
Mick, “Incompatible Experiences,” 354; Golczewski, “Die Heimatarmee und die Juden,” 664. For the murder of Ukrainians by the AK, see Motyka, Od rzezi wołyńskiej do Akcji, 331. For the murder of Ukrainians by NSZ, see Motyka, “Polska reakcja na działania UPA,” 85; Motyka, Od rzezi wołyńskiej do Akcji, 371–3.


Bibliography


Lebed’, Mykola. UPA, Ukrain’s’ka Povstans’ka Armii: iî heneza, risti i diï u vyzvol’niï borotbi ukrains’koho n. orodu za ukraïns’ku samostin’u sobornu derzhavu [UPA, Ukrainian Insurgent Army: its genealogy, growth and deeds concerning the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation for an independent and united state]. Presovebiuro UHVR, 1946.


Paź, Bogusław. “Omission as a Radical Form of Historical Lie. A Philosophical Analysis of Omission in the Context of Genocide in the Borderlands.” In Prawda historyczna a prawda polityczna w badaniach naukowych [The historical and political truth in the


